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The Main Thing is the Main Thing: A Response to “No Bench, No Game: Reconstituting Special Operations and Psychological Operations Depth from the Reserve.”

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This image was created by artificial intelligence

LTC Colin Blair


INTRODUCTION

MAJ Lucas Harrell’s article in September’s edition of the Eunomia Journal titled “No Bench, No Game: Reconstituting Special Operations Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Depth from the Reserve” is a welcome call to ready our Civil Affairs (CA) forces – specifically those residing the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) – for the rigors of Large-Scale Combat Operations, or LSCO. Lucas correctly notes that the expected casualties and lethal character of LSCO requires careful planning for the reconstitution of forces – a task made even more difficult as 90% of CA’s capabilities reside in USAR formations. However, his characterization of both the problem and the solution rests on misplaced assumptions that distract focus from building training readiness in Army Reserve formations.


NOTE: While I only mention CA forces in this article, the argument is largely applicable to Psychological Operations (PO) forces in the Army Reserve as well.


MAJ Harrell writes further that conventional reconstitution efforts are inadequate for Special Operations Forces regeneration; this may indeed be true. Where he strays is in the assumption that CA formations in the Reserve exist to reconstitute Special Operations Forces (SOF), writing that, “The readiness gap between Reserve and active-duty SOF personnel…represents a critical vulnerability in the event of protracted conflicts.” The implication is that USAR CA forces are intended to replace SOF CA forces in LSCO. There are several problems with this, notably in contradiction with Army doctrine and approved force structure.


DOCTRINE AND DEFINING OUR ROLE

Army Doctrinal Publication 3-05, Army Special Operations, and Field Manual (FM) 3-05, Army Special Operations, identify the purpose of special operations as an Army core competency, distinguish ARSOF units from conventional units, and describe how CA units within ARSOF contribute to 1st Special Forces Command (1st SFC), U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) directives and authorities.[i]. Notably, FM 3-05 identifies differences between conventional and SOF CA capabilities, noting the additional training in small-unit tactics, trauma medicine, and nonstandard logistics and communication, while clarifying that SOF CA units typically operate in politically sensitive or denied operational environments (OEs).[ii]. Nowhere in this SOF doctrine, or in conventional doctrine such as FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, are conventional CA capabilities directed to replace or reconstitute ARSOF forces. This is not a flaw, but a feature of the difference in purpose of the two CA forces. Thankfully, you don’t have to take my word for it – I can show it by examining approved force structure.


THE IMPORTANCE OF FORCE DESIGN

Army Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs) represent validated Army structure that provides mission, assignment, equipping, and personnel requirements to each Army unit via the Unit Identifier Code (UIC). An examination of the Table of Equipment (TOE) narratives for SOF and conventional CA forces illustrates the difference in purpose. For example, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) is aligned under 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), and “…primarily provides SOF Commanders a responsive, flexible, and modular CA force package.”[iii] While the TOE narrative does indicate that the 95th can support conventional forces during contingency operations, this is not its primary role. Instead, that role – by TOE narrative – falls to conventional CA Brigades located in the USAR. A comparison of the 95th against the 304th CA BDE (USAR) identifies the mission of the conventional CA BDE to conduct CA operations in support of a Theater Army or Corps via command and control of subordinate CA units and staff.[iv]. While the 95th has the flexibility to support both conventional and ARSOF forces, the same cannot be said of conventional CA units residing in the USAR. This is by design. The training and readiness gap that MAJ Harrell correctly notes exists because CA units in the USAR do not have a requirement to (train to) support ARSOF units or activities. Therefore, Lucas’ argument for a “paradigm shift” from the Army reserve training model rests on an unfounded assumption. This segues to my next critique of MAJ Harrell’s article in the realm of training and readiness standards.


THE IMPORTANCE OF REQUIREMENTS AND FUNDING

MAJ Harrell’s suggestion to place Reserve personnel into enhanced training pipelines, further integration with SOF CA units, and the establishment of a selection mechanism to pull the USAR’s best and brightest into a training pipeline is intriguing and not without its bright spots. Where he is led astray is in the misunderstanding of requirements – a word I come back to throughout this document for good reason. He conflates the training readiness of reserve components assigned to SOF units with the training readiness of reserve components supporting conventional units. This is a mistake. SOF reserve units, such as 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups, are assigned to 1st SFC. With this comes both P2 (conventional) and P11 (SOCOM) dollars that allow them to expend more resources to achieve additional training readiness directives. Unfortunately, the Army Reserve does not have the requirement or funding to achieve a similar level of readiness as our SOF brethren. Ultimately, the Army Reserve is funded to maintain just enough readiness to meet directed requirements. If a mass mobilization event occurs, the funds will flow, thereby granting the Army Reserve the time and space to quickly man, train, and equip units for mobilization and subsequent activities.

In a world unconstrained by limited funds and competing priorities, Lucas is right. In principle, CA units within USAR must understand their overlaps and divergences from their SOF counterparts, and work to close those gaps wherever possible. Wherever possible, I agree that the Army Reserve must be laser-focused on readiness and training, assuming calculated risk on low-yield and/or repetitive administrative tasks to build combat-ready formations. Should we squeeze as much training – ranging from the individual, to crew, to squad, and upwards – out of every Battle Assembly or Annual Training event? Absolutely! We have an obligation to do so. Should Army Reserve leaders eschew mind-numbing PowerPoint “training events” for field time and honing our craft? Of course. However, it’s critical to note that the Army Reserve is constrained by a budget that only allows for the building and sustaining of just enough readiness to meet directed requirements. And the truth is that combatant commands often accept risk in mission assignment by having USAR CA capabilities fulfill missions previously filled by SOF units. For example, rather than requiring that a CA Company complete austere/off-road driver’s training in Southern America, SOUTHCOM assumes risk by encouraging this training that SOF units would have zero issue fulfilling. When the Army Reserve reviews the mission requirements for funding, they rightly note that no requirement exists to complete this training; therefore, the combatant command has chosen to accept risk in this area. In other words, they’ve decided the training gap that MAJ Harrell identifies in this article isn’t as important as other competing funding requirements. Right or wrong, that is a reality we must face in the reserve component.


THE IMPORTANCE OF UICs and MOS’s

One final point I’ll note addresses Lucas’ final paragraph, where he proposes that the force won’t have time to argue over UICs and Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), but claims that the ability to do the job is most important. I agree, in part; competency in CA’s four core competencies and CA tactical mission tasks reigns supreme. However, there are important UIC and MOS distinctions that must be considered when assessing the relative training proficiency of Active and Reserve CA forces. I have a “Civil Affairs Pathway Fiscal Year 2025” chart hanging in my office that highlights these differences.[v]. One, SOF CA retains separate MOS’s: Civil Reconnaissance Sergeant (38R), Civil Affairs Medical Sergeant (38W), and Civil Affairs Governance Officer (38S). Two, their pathways look dramatically different from the 38A and 38B (Reserve CA Officer and NCO, respectively) pathways, with anywhere from 56 weeks (38R) to 94 weeks (38W) of training before becoming duty MOS qualified (DMOSQ). In comparison, Reserve CA pathways are 29 and 27 days, respectively. This is by design. The huge gap between the DMOSQ training of the two forces is proof of the difference in requirements of SOF and RC CA: one is funded, organized, and equipped in support of ARSOF-specific activities, the other funded, organized, and equipped in support of conventional activities with fewer additional training requirements like Survive, Evade, Resist, Escape or resident language training. If senior leaders decide that Reserve CA forces will need to reconstitute SOF forces in support of SOF activities, then the money will flow, and the gap will narrow. Until then, the main thing is the main thing. COMPO 3 units need to do the hard, definitively un-sexy blocking and tackling of effective unit training management in the basics, building training proficiency in their directed METs, SCTs, and individual tasks to be ready, both for competition requirements from the combatant commands, and for the specter of LSCO in our future. This is a tall order, and one that requires a clear understanding of the distinction between the mission, authorities, and corresponding organization, funding, and equipping by Army component.


The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect any official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, of any other U.S. government agency.


LTC Colin Blair is an Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Officer currently serving as the Doctrine Division Chief at the Civil Affairs Proponent, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School (USAJFKSWCS). He previously served as the Assistant Operations Officer and Chief of Operations for the 350th Civil Affairs Command in Pensacola, FL. He also served two overseas tours in Afghanistan doing Security Force Advisory work and has served over 15 years between the Active and Reserve components.


[i] Headquarters, Department of the Army. 2019. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-05, Army Special Operations. Washington D.C., Washington D.C., August 26.

[ii] Headquarters, Department of the Army. 2025. Field Manual (FM) 3-05, Army Special Operations. Washington D.C., Washington D.C., June 26.

[v] Civil Affairs Proponent, USAJFKSWCS. n.d. Civil Affairs Pathway FY25. Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

 

 

 
 
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