No Bench, No Game: Reconstituting Special Operations Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Depth from the Reserve

Civil Affairs Assessment and Selection candidates completing team events (Photo by DVIDS)

MAJ Lucas Harrell

President Volodymyr Zelensky’s NBC Interview on February 16, 2025, served as a sobering reminder of the human cost inherent in modern warfare. Zelensky estimated 46,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed during the three years of war since the Russian invasion in 2022.[i]

That’s substantially more casualties than the U.S. has endured in a long time. For example, according to the U.S. Defense Casualty Analysis System, the U.S. lost an estimated 6,743 service members since 2001 in five different named operations. That’s 6,743 military losses across 24 years as opposed to 46,000 in 3 years.[ii]

That’s a monthly rate for the U.S. (2001-2025) of approximately 24.3 deaths per month versus Ukraine (2022-2025) of approximately 1,243.2 deaths per month. (And this is not counting Russian losses.)

I pause to emphasize that our losses during 24-plus years of war were tragic and felt by every family member and brother- and sister-in-arms across our country and military community. Statistics are cold and unfeeling but hopefully set the conditions for preparation for what’s next, especially in a global setting that is already experiencing two large-scale conflicts.

The reality is, the U.S. military faces near-peer conflict as its next fight, and a careful analysis has to be conducted on our ability to face losses unseen in the last 40 years of U.S. military-involved conflict. This will require the replacement of, or rather the reconstitution of, U.S. forces, including those who are often first to fight: U.S. military special operations.

In contemporary military strategic discourse, reconstitution—the process of rebuilding combat capability after significant battlefield losses—remains inadequately addressed within the unique operational context of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Specifically, Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces critical to the modern application of Special Operations and a recognized teammate of the Special Forces that have arguably been over-relied upon for almost every military objective and solution since the beginning of the global war on terror.

Existing U.S. Army doctrine for reconstitution, specifically FM 4-0, Sustainment Operations and FM 3-0, Operations or the process of rebuilding combat capability following significant battlefield attrition is heavily oriented toward conventional forces.[iii] While effective for replenishing standard military units, this approach inadequately addresses the complex training, cultural expertise, and nuanced operational capabilities required by CA and PSYOP forces. The SOF truths, specifically III and IV (Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced, and Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur) specifically highlight this exact fact, yet integration planning ignores its own advice. These units that have been increasingly pivotal to achieving strategic, operational, and tactical military objectives throughout the Global War on Terror and in places not recognized as active war zones yet full of danger.

For that manpower replacement planning, it’s critical to remember that 92 percent of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations personnel are in the U.S. Army Reserve, yet that overwhelming percentage of the force is both doctrinally and institutionally hindered from training to the level in which they could be expected to perform in the middle of a near-peer conflict, replacing those who were engaged first with no loss in performance. To argue that the Reserve Component is not expected to perform at the same level and therefore not in need of similar training is to argue that the same aforementioned component is not capable or worthy of such training and protection.

China’s and Russia’s doctrinal emphasis on achieving strategic and operational effects through cyber warfare, information manipulation, and even targeted assassinations, amplifies the vulnerabilities of SOF personnel deployed in proximity to direct-action operations.  In fact, in such future conflicts, Special Operations Forces (SOF), particularly Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, will undoubtedly be targeted aggressively by adversaries employing advanced detection and targeting capabilities unseen in our historical experience. In the next fight (as templated by the modern conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza), we can expect:

·        Leveraging sophisticated signals intelligence capabilities to detect electronic emissions, track secure and unsecured communications, and exploit vulnerabilities in communication equipment. By intercepting and analyzing digital and radio communications, adversaries can pinpoint SOF units’ locations or operational patterns, enabling precise targeting for missile strikes, drone attacks, or ambushes.

·        Utilizing extensive surveillance infrastructure combined with AI-driven facial recognition technologies, adversaries could identify SOF personnel through captured imagery from surveillance drones, security cameras, social media exploitation, or reconnaissance satellites. China, in particular, has heavily invested in facial recognition and AI-enabled surveillance, dramatically enhancing its capacity to rapidly track and neutralize high-value targets.

·        Russia and China maintain robust human intelligence networks capable of infiltrating local populations, allied units, or even logistical chains supporting SOF operations. These HUMINT assets could gather detailed intelligence about unit movements, tactical objectives, or operational plans, facilitating targeted assassinations, ambushes, or sabotage operations. Combined with targeted disinformation campaigns, this method undermines local support and increases operational vulnerability.

Each of these methods presents substantial challenges to SOF survivability. Historical precedent indicates that adversaries will prioritize neutralizing SOF due to their disproportionate operational impact and the strategic disruption that follows their attrition. Are we ready to replace these losses in a timely manner to maintain operational tempo?

In fact, according to a wargame report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the United States would lose 3,200 troops in the first three weeks of combat with China. That number is nearly half of all the American troops that died in two decades of war in Iraq and Afghanistan combined.[iv]

Historical analyses of reconstitution efforts during protracted conflicts, such as those detailed in the recent Military Review article on lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, underscore the limitations inherent in traditional reconstitution doctrine.[v] Conventional frameworks, which prioritize rapid numerical replacement through accelerated training and equipment replenishment, fail to accommodate the complex demands of the CA and PSYOP community where so much of the force resides in the Reserve. The detailed expertise required for effective CA and PSYOP operations—ranging from language proficiency and regional specialization to psychological resilience and sophisticated strategic communication capabilities—cannot be hastily replicated.

Moreover, traditional reconstitution approaches do not address the qualitative aspect of SOF regeneration, a concern highlighted in recent NATO analyses examining Russia’s challenges in replenishing its elite forces during ongoing conflicts.[vi]  In essence, the current doctrinal framework does not recognize that SOF casualties create capability voids that cannot be quickly resolved merely by numerical replacements.

The readiness gap between Reserve and active-duty SOF personnel, particularly in CA and PSYOP roles, represents a critical vulnerability in the event of protracted conflicts. Addressing this gap requires a paradigm shift from traditional Reserve training models toward a system designed for seamless integration from its current role in conventional support to rapid integration in doctrinally established reconstitution strategy.

Such a discussion and I emphasize the word discussion would rigorously evaluate cognitive aptitude, physical performance, and psychological resilience, selectively identifying Reserve personnel suitable for intensive SOF-aligned training pipelines.

For our well-educated, experienced, and capable Reserve Component CA and PSYOP teammates, I will argue that unlike previous senior leaders who argue that we can only do one thing, that in fact, we can both train for and accomplish two things. It’s at least worth discussing, isn’t it?

An article from Breaking Defense discusses how Special Operations Command leadership envisions a “renaissance” for Special Forces amid rising great power competition, emphasizing that Special Operations Forces (SOF) will return to their original, unconventional warfare roots. The SOCOM chief highlights the need for SOF units to adapt quickly to evolving warfare environments characterized by advanced technology, cyber threats, and hybrid warfare tactics posed by adversaries such as China and Russia.[vii]

By elevating Reserve training standards and fostering regular integration exercises with active-duty SOF units, the Army can significantly reduce mobilization latency and enhance operational interoperability. This selective training model, advocated in recent publications addressing Special Operations readiness, ensures that Reserve forces meet the demands of immediate deployment into complex operational environments. Adding a measurement of performance (How well can we replace, if asked, our SOF CA/PSYOP counterparts in modern warfare at our current state of readiness and training) can only push the whole team towards success. Can additional capacity for integration, reconstitution and downtime minimization not be added into our current conventional doctrinal roles and training? I would argue that modernization demands we must.

Historical precedent and contemporary analysis consistently affirm that the capacity to rapidly replace specialized personnel is integral to sustained operational effectiveness. The development of scalable wartime training pipelines tailored explicitly for SOF roles is thus a strategic necessity.

Such pipelines should maintain rigorous selection and qualification standards while streamlining training timelines to enable expedited deployment without compromising mission effectiveness.

One approach worth debating is establishing a specialized, merit-based selection pipeline within the Reserve CA and PSYOP communities. Such a model could identify reservists with exceptional cognitive aptitude, advanced language skills, cultural agility, and higher physical fitness standards. Would this inadvertently create divisions within the Reserve force, potentially leading to morale issues? Or might it instead foster a positive competitive environment, increasing overall readiness and effectiveness, characteristics of a winning team?

Implementing pre-war identification systems for potential SOF candidates within conventional forces and Reserves can expedite mobilization. Establishing strategically located regional training hubs further reduces logistical bottlenecks and enhances the responsiveness of the training apparatus during the early and middles phases of conflict.

A second approach could involve increasing the frequency and intensity of joint Reserve and active-duty SOF exercises. Embedding reservists directly into ongoing training rotations could dramatically reduce integration friction. While these do occur, is it common enough to build depth?

I can’t help but think of when I completed an Observer Controller and Trainer (OC/T) rotation a few years ago in which the maneuver commander asked the Civil Affairs element attached to the Rotational Force if they provide a particular type of support to his planned engagement. When the Reserve Civil Affairs team leader started highlighting what he could bring to the table, but stated that they weren’t the SOF Civil Affairs group that were also within the battlespace, the maneuver commander interrupted him with “You’re CA, aren’t you?”

Rarely have I seen a battlespace owner interested in the intricacies of internecine branch conflicts over who is who and not just expect the same level of results from all parties associated with a job.

This is often the point at which the staunch defenders of the separation between U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs and U.S. Army Special Operations Civil Affairs rise up and begin defending U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.

They’ll highlight that the Reserve Component CA and PSYOP units and soldiers have a different, unique mission, critical to the conventional forces. That the Reserve soldier brings their civilian career experience, their knowledge of the civilian community, and their wealth of experience that comes from having one of the most arguably utilized military occupational specialties and mission set across the entire world during both peacetime and war as opposed to those active duty soldiers who often aren’t familiar with the civilian environment that they are trained to manage.

I would agree with all of that.

Otherwise, I wouldn’t have spent more than 10 years and 3 deployments within U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) in what I consider the best job in the Army and the highlight of my operational experience where I have seen the most tangible effects of both inter-agency efforts and non-lethal/center of gravity targeting.

This simply isn’t rehashing that same old conversation.

And it’s certainly not another article from within the CA community asking for a beret, a tab, or anything else that makes our special operations peers sigh and side-eye us.

We have a unique job which makes us special, and it’s okay to like your job.

This conversation is about the reality of war today and preparing to win it tomorrow. We owe that to our peers to realize that asking for self-improvement is not an attempt to degrade or differentiate between our SOF and Reserve Component brethren, but to start to have the discussion on what we can accomplish together. I can’t help but notice during each training iteration with 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion, Naval Special Warfare Group 11, 123rd Special Tactics Squadron, and more, that these sister service Reserve Component special operations groups' training is modernized and purposeful and they can (and do) integrate quickly into mission planning with their active-duty brethren with no lag.

So, what are we missing?

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are uniquely positioned to be the first units engaged in conflict, particularly in high-stakes, near-peer confrontations where rapid response and strategic initiative are paramount. Given their forward placement and critical roles in shaping operational conditions, these units may also be among the earliest to suffer casualties. Therefore, the ability to swiftly and effectively replace or reconstitute these specialized forces becomes a decisive factor.

Minimizing the wait between frontline losses and the deployment of equally capable replacements ensures that operational momentum is maintained, allowing the U.S. to outpace the adversary’s capacity to adapt. This rapid regeneration of combat power directly supports the fundamental doctrinal principle of unity of effort, enabling commanders to seize and retain the initiative by maintaining continuous pressure at a tempo faster than the enemy can respond.

In tomorrow’s fight, when you enter the battlefield as the second person to do your job, we won’t have time to argue over unit identification codes and special military occupational specialties but rather who can do their duty. Which is still, and always will be, to win.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect any official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, of any other U.S. government agency.

About the Author

Major Lucas Harrell is an U.S. Army Civil Affairs officer, currently serving in the United Kingdom, as the Operations Chief for the Africa Command Counter-Threat Finance Group. MAJ Harrell has completed four military deployments to Afghanistan, East and West Africa, and Eastern Europe. In addition, he has recently completed an operational embassy assignment in West Africa and is currently a student in an Army sponsored master's program. MAJ Harrell's writing has been published in the Modern War Institute at West Point, the Civil Affairs Association Journal, Small Wars Journal, and Real Clear Defense. His civilian occupation is within the intelligence community.

[i] Hodunova, Kateryna, “Over 46,000 Ukrainian Soldiers Killed since Start of Russia’s Full-Scale War, Zelensky Says.” The Kyiv Independent, February 17, 2025. https://kyivindependent.com/over-46-000-ukrainian-soldiers-killed-since-start-of-war-zelensky-says/.

[ii] DOD, “U.S. Defense Casualty Analysis System.” Defense Casualty Analysis System, 2025. https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/app/conflictCasualties.

[iii] U.S. Army, Corps and Division Planner’s Guide to Reconstitution Operations, FM 100-9 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2023), https://www.army.mil.

[iv] Malley, Blaise, “War with China over Taiwan Won’t End Well for Anyone.” Responsible Statecraft, July 6, 2023. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/01/10/war-with-china-over-taiwan-wont-end-well-for-anyone/.

[v] T. Haydock and J. Meeker, “Lessons in Reconstitution from the Russia-Ukraine War,” Military Review, January-February 2025, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/September-October-2024/September-October-2024-UA1.pdf.

[vi] Atlantic Council, Prospects for Reconstitution of Russian Military Power (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2025), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/nato-russia-dynamics-prospects-for-reconstitution-of-russian-military-power/.

[vii] Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “SOCOM Chief Sees ‘Renaissance’ for Special Forces amid Great Power Competition, Evolving Warfare,” Breaking Defense, May 7, 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/socom-chief-sees-renaissance-for-special-forces-amid-great-power-competition-evolving-warfare/.