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A Force for Winning without Fighting

2022 CIVIL AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM WORKSHOP REPORT

A Force for Winning without Fighting

by Colonel Christopher Holshek, USA, Ret.

ISSUE PAPER

The Power of the People: Civil Affairs and Civil Resistance

by Captain Danial Moriarty, USA

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Reclaiming Civil Affairs as a Strategic Asset: Identifying “Deep Expertise” for the Benefit of the Army

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by Captain John Wirges, USA

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Social Sciences Contribution to Civil Affairs

by Captain John McLaughlin, USA

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Civil Affairs:
A Force for Winning without Fighting

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The Civil Affairs Association

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U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School/
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and

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Foreword

The Civil Affairs Association's annual Symposium on *Civil Affairs: A Force for Winning without Fighting*, held online from 14–15 November 2022 continued to validate the enduring applicability of timeless Civil Affairs Corps themes. As outgoing President, I see a great future for the Civil-Military enterprise, which has encompassed “winning without fighting.” While our national military leadership rediscovers the impressive capabilities of this talented and diverse force of Soldiers and Marines, the deliberations at our events over the past few years have rung increasingly as “back to the future” moments. There are many examples.

Among these is the realization, best explained by Symposium keynote speaker Brig. Gen. “Will” Guillaume Beaurpere, who commands the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), that our Corps motto, “Secure the Victory” does not apply solely to post-conflict situations. Civil affairs, as he put it, can help achieve *victory before war*.

Another has been progress in the revival of the 38G military government functional specialist program. This time, however, not just for post-conflict reconstruction, but as a capability to help create access and influence through a deeper understanding of the political, social, and cultural context and networks. This helps provide strategic warning through the identification of civil threats in the countries and societies that we with our allies and partners can help to secure and stabilize.

The innovative thinking that new U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) [USACAPOC(A)] Commander, Major General (MG) Isaac Johnson Jr., is making both its 38G and Civil Affairs (CA) generalists more an information force than an information related capability. Through an active sense of CA readiness from a consistent forward presence and involvement in strategic competition in the region, personnel can best support their primary customers the Geographic and Service Component Commands in gaining and maintaining informational and other positional advantages vital to winning without fighting across the entire competition continuum.

Most encouraging were the remarks at our October Annual Meeting by keynote speaker Lieutenant General (LTG) Xavier T. Brunson, Commander US Army 1st Corps, which showed the growing awareness of the value of America's “warrior-diplomats” that senior Army leaders are embracing, especially in rising to the challenges of strategic competition in complex, people centric mission environments. Their acknowledgement that CA is best suited to help them see, understand, engage, and influence the human as well as information dimensions is encouraging. As the U.S. military shifts away from the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and focuses on its “pacing challenge” with China, the General has recognized that this challenge “isn't purely combat oriented.”

The goal in both strategic competition and integrated deterrence is to provide engagement with U.S. allies and its partners in the region to prevent potential crises, while encouraging more engagements in diplomatic and humanitarian areas, to avoid having a crisis escalate into conflict.

This requires other forms of power that are supported by and coordinated with military power all at the heart of integrated deterrence, winning without fighting, and civil affairs.

The opportunities LTG Brunson sees in the Indo-Pacific region demonstrate the need for engagement across diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic activities. “It is really more about building relationships; no military operation can be divorced from civil considerations.” He recalled CA’s long legacy of population engagement and understanding of the human dimension as far back as the Lewis and Clark expedition. Nowadays, the Army must compete and win without fighting now as much as be prepared to conduct major combat operations later. “Civil Affairs, in shaping the human dimension, is our premier military capability to win without fighting.”¹

The Association’s role in convening the extended CA Corps through the Symposium and Roundtable, *Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, *Eunomia Journal* and *One CA* podcasts, helps enable civil-military professionals and force developers to develop strategic options and foster an expanded, multicomponent, interservice, interallied and interorganizational enterprise of enterprises to assist in alleviating hostile environments which is critical to winning without fighting in an era of strategic competition. While these platforms help mainstream CA into the larger discussions of the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Joint Force, they also help improve CA professionals analytical and writing skills, effectively promoting intellectual capitalization and intellectual readiness.

Civil Affairs Association events and platforms provide an open, collegial space for major civil-military commands and centers of excellence to gather and assist, the institutional coordination in policy, doctrinal, force and professional development, not to mention the sharing of best practices. These institutions include: the CA Proponent at the USAJFKSWCS, USACAPOC(A), the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), the NATO accredited Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Centre of Excellence (CCoE), and also the United Nations Office of Military Affairs.

The Symposium and Roundtable drive an ongoing, annual thematic discussion on the future of CA. Together, they are now on their 11th year of advancing a more strategic and comprehensive understanding of CA. They also help to foster a learning organization that goes beyond military command structures and the CA Corps, to include allies and counterpart civil-military organizations and interagency, interorganizational private sector partners.

Our Symposium includes workshops that represent the critical constituencies of the following: the CA Corps; the US Army and US Marine Corps CA proponents: the major US Army Command that is home to CA as well as psychological operations (PSYOP) and information operations (IO) forces; allied and multinational civil-military allied counterparts; interagency and interorganizational partners and associates; and the US Army and Marine non-commissioned

¹ See Holshek, Christopher, “Association Holds Its First On-Site Event Since 2019,” *2022 Civil Affairs Association Annual Meeting Report*, Civil Affairs Association, 2 November 2022

officers (NCOs) and junior leaders who not only represent the CA community of practice but the future of the CA Corps.

The *Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, now in its ninth volume, is the Association's capstone professional and force development deliverable. It serves to deepen and broaden formal institutional processes for CA force development, policy, doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF-P). Since 2012, the Association has added the *One CA* podcast and *Eunomia Journal* as increasingly well-respected platforms for interdisciplinary professional dialogue.

The Association has also been busy growing its own interorganizational partners. In addition to the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), it includes the CCoE, the Reserve Officer Association, the Foreign Area Officers Association, the Military Officers Association of America, the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, and the Alliance for Peacebuilding. Since last year, the Association has joined forces with the Modern War Institute and Irregular Warfare Initiative at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Joint Special Operations University, and the Joint Civil-Military Interaction Global Research and Education Network. Additional institutional collaboration efforts are in the works.

Our foremost thanks go to Niagara University in helping us make this publication possible. Their partnership has been invaluable. Special thanks go to Jaclyn Rossi Drozd, University Vice President for Institutional Advancement, Suzanne Karaszewski, Associate Director of Creative Services, Army Lieutenant Colonel Stephan Lucas, Professor of Military Science, and Nani Bailey, Assistant at the ROTC Department for their diligence and cooperation.

Additional thanks go to our Issue Papers Committee: Chairman, Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, USA (Ret.); editors Colonel Christopher Holshek, USA (Ret.), Colonel Dennis Cahill, USA (Ret.), and Colonel Larry Rubini, USA (Ret.); committee members Colonel Caroline Pogge, USA, Major General Mike Kuehr, USA, (Ret.), Colonel Leonard J. DeFrancisci, USMC (Ret.) Colonel Michael Cleary, USA (Ret.), and Colonel Donald Vacha, USA; as well as the authors themselves.

Our website continues to improve while our social media outlets have expanded beyond Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn to Spotify and Sticher. Thanks go to Association Vice President Colonel Arnel David, USA and Major John McElligott for their diligence and hard work.

We are grateful to Third Order Effects, Civil Solutions International, Valka Mir Human Security, the Patriot Fund and Conducttr, for their sponsorships. We look forward to having them and additional sponsors to join us in the future.

The Association is also grateful to USAJFKSWCS, PKSOI, USACAPOC(A), the State and Defense Departments, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as various functional and regional commands for their engagement. Special thanks also go to the CCoE, with whom we are advancing our common civil-military enterprise on both sides of the

Atlantic as well as with additional multinational partners, as well as to the Association of the United States Army and the Modern War Institute and Irregular Warfare Initiative for helping to mainstream the discussion of the future of the Civil Affairs Corp into the broader discussion of the future of the U.S. Army.

Singular thanks go to Association Vice President Colonel Christopher Holshek, USA, (Ret.) and the Symposium workshop facilitators MG Daniel Ammerman, USA, (Ret.), Colonel Dennis Cahill, USA (Ret.), Colonel Jason Arndt, Colonel Arnel David, USA, Mr. Ryan McCannell, and Mr. James Jabinal for a great Symposium and Roundtable program which is available for viewing online on the *Eunomia Journal* YouTube channel.

Finally, our thanks go out to the many members and supporters of the Association who contribute quietly to our worldwide civil-military enterprise to educate, advocate and motivate.

We look forward to seeing you at the online Civil Affairs Roundtable on 11 April 2023. To learn more and to join our Association, visit www.civilaffairsassoc.org.

“Secure the Victory!”

Joseph P. Kirlin III
Colonel, USA, (Ret) Civil Affairs
President
The Civil Affairs Association

2022 Civil Affairs Symposium Report

By Colonel Christopher Holshek, USA Retired

The Civil Affairs Association hosted its annual web-based Symposium, sponsored by The Patriot Fund, Third Order Effects, Civil Solutions International, Valka Mir Human Security, and Conducttr, from 14-15 November 2022. The event, involving nearly 300 participants, was in coordination with the Association of the United States Army, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Joint Special Operations University, the Modern War Institute's Irregular Warfare Initiative, and NATO accredited Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence.

Last year's Symposium concluded that, whether for large-scale combat operations, irregular warfare, or great power competition, advantage goes to those who consistently amass a superior learning network. Institutionally as well as operationally, this comes from a continual process of building civil-military networks that strengthen alliances and attract new partners. The war in Ukraine and heightened competition with China and Russia across the regions have affirmed not only the criticality of gaining, maintaining, and leveraging such human networks but also how that improves understanding and integrating civil considerations and contextual understanding.

As the U.S. military shifts away from conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia, it has begun focusing on its "pacing challenge" with China. "That challenge isn't purely combat-oriented," observed 1st U.S. Corps commander Lt. Gen. Xavier T. Brunson. The goal is to provide engagement with U.S. allies and partners in the region to prevent potential crises from escalating into conflicts. Those crises are often humanitarian and diplomatic in nature, requiring other forms of power that are supported by and coordinated with military power.

Given new national security and defense strategies, Army operations doctrine, the designation of CA as an "information force," and NATO concepts such as "cognitive warfare," how should the expanded Civil Affairs Corps integrate institutionally with supported military commands and civilian agencies to become a better force to win without fighting? What changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy should take place within and beyond current capacities? How should they be prioritized and implemented? What levels of joint, interorganizational, multinational, and commercial coordination are needed?

These were among the questions this year's Symposium's speakers, workshops, and *Civil Affairs Issue Papers* presentations explored to enable the CA Corps to offer ways ahead to related institutional and policy leadership.

Major Findings

Although not all the answers the Symposium explored were comprehensive or conclusive, the participants did identify some interesting findings of relevance to CA force development:

- Beyond the traditional military-centric understanding of deterrence, integrated deterrence, introduced in the new *National Security Strategy*, is much more than being able to defeat adversaries more quickly and decisively or even consolidating and shaping a more favorable post-conflict environment. Integrated deterrence is about winning without fighting. In conflict prevention, across domains, across regions, across the spectrum of conflict, and among U.S. agencies as well as with allies and interorganizational partners—gaining, maintaining, and denying political and informational positional advantages that obviate the use of force and ensure its success, must force be wielded.
- Civil affairs is the *de facto* joint force of choice to win without fighting by supporting and implementing integrated deterrence not just to “secure the victory” before, during, and after major combat but also in preventing it in the first place. More Army leaders are coming to realize that “secure the victory” does not apply solely to post-conflict situations.
- As the premier civil-military and information force in the human dimension of integrated deterrence, CA forces facilitate civil-military situational understanding, strategic early warning, and superior politico-military decision-making through continuous civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, civil networking, and knowledge integration. Per a 2022 CA Capability Manager information paper, CA’s main value lies in its “inimitable ability to provide comprehensive and actionable knowledge of governance and the drivers of instability within the civil populace, validate and integrate civil considerations into the operations process, and leverage civilian capabilities and resources to mitigate political, economic, and social challenges inherent to operations across the competition continuum.”
- As the Capability Manager also briefed at the Annual Meeting, CA forces provide “a fully trained, organized, and missioned capability to detect, disrupt, and defeat threats within the physical, human, and information dimensions of the civil component; gain information advantage; conduct actions to consolidate gains; enable or provide civil governance; preserve combat power; maintain operational tempo; and conduct special operations.”
- To do this requires a military institutional understanding of capabilities like CA as maneuver forces in the psycho-cultural spaces of war and integrated deterrence. Much more than mere “force multipliers” or “enablers,” the Association has contended, these warrior-diplomats must be organized, managed, resourced, and integrated with the same institutional and operational seriousness as combat forces.
- This also requires a universally active sense of CA readiness for strategic competition that only a constant forward regional presence of all CA force types provide. Integrated deterrence finds greatest positional advantage in the global civil-military network gained and maintained through the interallied and interorganizational system among the world’s leading democracies. It is enabling the U.S. and NATO, for example, to play a decisive stand-off role in thwarting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and countering Chinese regional strategy.

- To improve or expand the inherent capacities and capabilities of CA forces and maintain readiness for multicomponent civil-military transitions, regional commands must more than include sufficient CA forces in deliberate contingency planning and have them ready and available for early entry. They must employ sufficient active and reserve component CA forces in persistent engagement and security cooperation to develop enduring relationships that shape and build the decisive positional advantages of a robust global civil-military network, provide civilian and military senior leadership with increased options and flexibility, and (as necessary) set favorable conditions in conflict and post-conflict. Exercises, including wargaming and experimentation, are a cost-effective way to program and integrate a more robust and persistent presence of multicomponent CA forces in regions and in integration with interorganizational partners.
- Strategic employment of Army 38G government specialists is illustrative of the way to employ contemporary CA capabilities to shape the competition environment and “secure the victory” well before armed conflict. In addition to creating access, influence, and other positional advantage capacities through the networks they help build side-by-side with conventional and SOF CA Soldiers, 38Gs deepen the understanding of political, economic, social, and cultural factors whose security implications are more critical in strategic competition—as the war in Ukraine demonstrates. To be most effective, however, 38G officers must be as adept at communicating and operationalizing stability sector expertise with military commands as in communicating and collaborating with civilian partners.
- A more robust, standardized CA core curriculum helps level the inconsistencies in CA capacities across components that forward presence and talent may not. This makes the CA Corps more interoperable and interchangeable across components and a more consistently reliable capability for supported commands. There are also many distance and online resources such as from the Army University Press, Combined Arms Center, and other professional military education (PME) and non-PME education and training resources listed on the Association website. Another opportunity for reserve CA professionals is the Army’s U.S. Military Observer Group discussed below and at the last Roundtable.
- The Association’s intellectual capitalization platforms, like the Symposium, Roundtable, Issue Papers, *OneCA* podcast, *Eunomia Journal*, etc., provide unique opportunity to deepen collective understanding of CA force development challenges. This understanding moves CA force development forward faster and more comprehensively to keep pace with threats, and deepen, as well as widen, a worldwide civil-military learning organization through flank coordination with civil-military allies and interorganizational partners.
- As Lt. Gen. Brunson said at the Annual Meeting (and as retired Lt. Gen. Eric Wesley tendered at the 2021 Roundtable), greater CA presence among Army and joint commands can help them better understand how to win without fighting through civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and knowledge integration in strategic competition and integrated deterrence. This mitigates an overemphasis on major combat operations and great power competition with Russia and China (in response to failures in Afghanistan and Iraq), and corrects insufficient understanding of allies and interorganizational partners.

Keynote Speaker

Nowhere was “winning without fighting”—the theme for the Symposium and the *2022-23 Civil Affairs Issue Papers*—more concisely argued than with keynote speaker Brig. Gen. “Will” Guillaume Beaurpere’s argument that it “is central to the concept of integrated deterrence as presented in our *National Defense Strategy*.” The Commanding General of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) explained that the “sheer scale of destructive power and the devastation to the global order that could result from a large-scale conflict with our strategic adversary should urge all of us to drive ruthlessly toward ‘winning without fighting’ – or, put another way, to achieve *victory before war*.”

Beaurpere confided that this year’s theme “will generate the critical dialogue and unique ideas we need to deliver Civil Affairs to the Army and the joint force... We have a unique opportunity over the next few days of this Symposium to consider this concept through the lens of our Civil Affairs capability and capacity.” As the USAJFKSWCS Commander, his priority is to “deliver the doctrine, training, leader development, and personnel solutions for a range of irregular warfare capabilities that are ready and capable to support both the Army and the Joint Force of 2030.” To address the issue of how to shape the CA force of 2030 to contribute to integrated deterrence, he focused on three CA force development areas: multi-component training equity and alignment; development of the Army’s 38G capability; and modernization of the active component training pathway.

“We should not be comfortable with 2030 as our time horizon,” he stated. Considering the “pacing threat” of China, CA must respond to 2030 challenges as soon as 2027. “We may even see roles for our CA forces before then in post-conflict Ukraine or across a range of other crises around the globe.” This means that CA soldiers signing up today could very well face a crisis or conflict during their first tour of duty. “To drive and implement change to our CA training pathway, we must visualize and describe the CA soldier in MDO [multi-domain operations], ruthlessly test and validate his capabilities in training and experimentation, and continually draw from this and ongoing conflicts to evolve our training and leader development strategies,” he submitted.

Regardless of component, CA forces must constantly focus on civil-military transitions along the competition continuum. Much CA capacity and capability develops during strategic competition through deliberate engagement with host nations to understand civil governance structures and systems. When crisis and conflict emerge, the CA Corps draws from this depth of knowledge to advise commanders and set the conditions—simultaneously in the deep, close, and rear areas—for post-conflict transition back to functioning host-nation governance systems, transition of enemy-controlled territory to friendly forces, and transition to sustainable stability.

An example of this was *Operation Inherent Resolve*. As the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), enabled by small teams of SOF advisors, reclaimed ISIS-controlled terrain, CA team leaders found themselves *de facto* mayors for large cities like Raqqah, administering governance functions while working to re-establish SDF control and stability in Northeast Syria. Leveraging small CA teams along with other SOF in the periphery enabled the CJTF to focus on its main effort in liberating

large swaths of territory in neighboring Iraq. Among the many lessons being incorporated into CA doctrine and training is how the CA force must prepare for the possibility that indigenous partners will seize enemy-controlled terrain and begin similar localized transitions.

“As I visualize this 2030 battlefield, SOF Civil Affairs forces would have the charge of developing, engaging, and leveraging civil networks in the deep area to identify key governance systems and infrastructure to be preserved as the joint force advances against the enemy. This would include key individuals and organizations that would enable the rapid reconstitution of host nation governance and stabilization while maintaining economy of force,” he pointed out.

With respect to reserve training equity and alignment, Brig. Gen. Beurpere admitted that “the initial training qualification pathway is not sufficient to ensure the transition of CA responsibilities from the close area to the rear area,” a risk to mission requires training and leader development programs to address. The idea of “exceptional officers with unique civilian skills in the reserve component” consistently throughout the whole of the reserve force is not realistic. “There are highly talented individuals in the reserve component who, by benefit of unique experiences in their full-time civilian career, or just sheer natural aptitude, can easily handle anything the future environment may throw at them. However, we cannot build a capability around the idea, *or hope*, of having such exceptional individuals in every place we will need them.”

To ensure a sufficiently trained corps of reserve CA personnel for the environments described above, the reserve officer qualification course must expand to match the length of the active component Phase I course. A similar disparity exists between enlisted reserve military occupational specialty (MOS) transfers into CA, necessitating a similar expansion for that population. This will require a commitment of resources, but it would also simplify training requirements across components and lend itself for better interoperability between CA elements dispersed across the joint force operational framework. While it does not mean sending reservists through the full active component pathway, “that idea is not off the table entirely.”

Alignment and rebalancing active and reserve components to address the many current unfilled requisitions for SOF in the global force management system and the future demands for SOF CA and PSYOP in the potential large-scale conflicts of 2030 and beyond is also a serious consideration. Within that, aligning force structure to COMPO 2 (National Guard) CA in certain states that have the resources to adequately man, train, and equip such units and ample opportunities for CA Soldiers to practice their skills in real-world humanitarian disaster situations. “The analysis is ongoing and I hope this forum generates useful ideas to propel them forward. Given what we know and anticipate, a highly capable conventional CA force is critical for the 2030 fight.”

Brig. Gen. Beurpere reported that the 38G CA functional specialist program, approved in 2013 and with its first in-service transfers in 2015, has surged following the CA Proponent’s Force Modernization Assessment, or FMA, conducted from 2019 to 2020. The first direct commissioned candidate into the 38G program was last December, with 89 more direct commission candidates as the training pathway is finalized and codified. “A robust corps of experts across the various

domains of governance is within reach, and we will continue to pursue this critical capability and I would challenge this group to think about other gaps that could be filled with such a program. (For a deeper dive into the 38G functional specialist program, which has grown by nearly 1,000% since 2019, see the Association Annual Meeting Report pm the presentation by Col. Scott DeJesse, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) Cultural Programs Officer.)

The active component training pathway modernization is another initiative spurred forward by the CA Force Modernization Assessment and an essential component of building the CA force of 2030. The most significant change from the previous CA qualification course is the acknowledgement of and specific training and education on governance. The CA Proponent is drafting the Transitional Governance ATP in coordination with the 3rd Training Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), which is developing specific modules on Governance in Phases I and II of the active pathway as well as incorporating governance problems and scenarios in the *Operation Sluss-Tiller* Culmination Exercise to validate individual governance understanding and competence.

“Active component SOF CA forces must understand governance systems to set the conditions for successful re-establishment of effective host nation governance systems post-conflict,” he stressed, “but we should not be satisfied with only addressing governance without taking into account information advantage implications on the future CA mission. We have successfully implemented a Synthetic Internet Training Environment in our PSYOP culmination exercise and should expand this to CA exercises to build inherently digital native Soldiers that can extend their understanding and influence into the information dimension. There are likely other initiatives we can build on here and I welcome your thoughts to continuously refine our training.”

Brig. Gen. Beaupere concluded by admitting that the picture of what CA Forces must be prepared to do in the future is not a complete picture. “We need all of your help to better understand and define what will be required of the force for 2030. To be frank, we won’t fully know what the environment of 2030 will demand until 2030. The history of futurology indicates that this is all but certain to be the case. With that in mind, however, we must rigorously explore the possibilities and develop so that we may be prepared to adjust to the future reality from a position of strength.”

While he discussed some of the avenues to prepare for this uncertain future, he did not think these measures alone are enough. “We are looking for more innovative ways to shape a CA force that can enable the MDO fight and ensure the successful consolidation of gains and post-conflict stabilization,” he elicited his audience. “To deter the calamity of a great power conflict, we must be prepared to credibly excel in every phase of that conflict... With that, I implore you all to take the opportunity these two days afford to deepen our collective understanding of the future fight; to widen our aperture of the means to improve our posture; and to move forward from this event with actionable solutions to get us where we need to be. Challenge yourselves and each other to meet the urgent demands the Nation has placed upon us.”

Workshop I – Civil Affairs in Joint, Army, Marine Corps, and NATO Initiatives

Fittingly, Workshop I, which featured representatives from the institutional proponents for U.S. Army and Marine Corps Civil Affairs, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and the NATO accredited Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Centre of Excellence (CCoE), followed Brig. Gen. Beaurpere's keynote speech. The panel provided updates on initiatives that help build CA and CIMIC forces capable of working with others to win without fighting.

This recurring panel was facilitated by Col. (Ret.) Dennis J. Cahill, Deputy Civil Affairs Capability Manager at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Force Modernization Center (UFMC) and a member of the CA Association Board of Directors. Since the representatives from the Joint Civil Affairs Proponent (Lt. Col. Micah Baker) and the Army Civil Affairs Capability Manager (Col. Kurt Sisk) were unable to attend, Col. (Ret.) Cahill presented in their absence.

For the Joint CA Proponent, Col. (Ret) Cahill reported the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) J39 was updating the 23 Jan 2018 USSOCOM Directive 525-38, *Civil Military Engagement* (CME). The Directive provides definitions, concepts, and guidance and assigns responsibilities for the support and conduct of the USSOCOM CME Program of Record. According to the directive, CME is "persistent engagement conducted by USSOCOM assigned civil affairs by, with, and through unified action partners (UAP) to shape conditions and influence indigenous populations and institutions (IPI) within the operational environment (OE) in support of Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Campaign Plans, the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) Campaign Support Plan, and in conjunction with U.S. Embassy (USEMB) strategies." It goes on to say: "The CME program increases the capability of U.S. Government (USG) supported IPI, reduces the influence of malign actors within targeted countries, and leverages civil vulnerabilities and resiliencies within the OE in support of..." theater and country plans and strategies. At any time, 30-40 Civil-Military Support Elements (CMSEs) may be operational in as many countries across the globe, with a presence in every theater, except for NORTHCOM. By all accounts, the CME program offers a great return on investment in those theaters and countries when it comes to working with our partners to counter malign influence during competition – a very important activity that supports winning without fighting.

On behalf of the CA Capability Manager, Col. (Ret.) Cahill reported on several areas:

- The CA Capability Manager is working closely with several partner organizations to ensure current and future CA capabilities are properly captured in key policy documents and initiatives within the Department of Defense and USSOCOM.
- The CA Capability Manager is also integrating CA capabilities—including ideas for the execution of governance and stabilization—into the Army Operating Concept 2040 and the supporting documents of the new Army Concept Framework. These documents feed Army experimentation and future force designs.
- The Civil Affairs Science and Technology Learning Environment (CASTLE) Initiative continues to make progress in documenting a process that leverages applied social, data, and learning sciences to address the social, political, economic, and cultural factors that influence populations through information dominance in great power competition, multi-

domain operations, and irregular warfare. The Initiative made great strides by observing the 97th CA Bn (SO)(A)'s CKI process during Project Convergence 22 in October, working closely with members of the Office of Analytics at the State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO).

- In the area of Warfighters and other exercises, the Capability Manager is supporting the Operations Group at Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) and USACAPOC(A) to combine the Civil Affairs Brigade Command Post Exercise-Functional (CPX-F) with Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 23-4 this year. This should provide an excellent opportunity to exercise a brigade-level Civil Affairs Task Force (CATF) with subordinate CA battalions working in the Corps and Division Rear. Elements of the 95th CA Bde (SO)(A) are also participating in the WfX, enabling the exercise of SOF-CF CA Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence (I3). Finally, a Table Top Exercise (TTX) led by the 95th CA Bde (SO)(A) in May will bring in elements of USACAPOC(A) and multiple U.S. Government agencies, providing the opportunity to exercise Civil-Military Integration at several levels.

Dr. Dale Walsh completed the CA Command Manager portion with the USAR CA Force Design Update that creates structure to align new CA core competencies and Army 2030/2040 objectives. Maj. (Ret.) Alfonso G. DeVeyra III, of the Civil Affairs Proponent's Doctrine Development Division at USAJFKSWCS updated the CA Branch Proponent task organization led by Lt. Col. Salvatore Candela. He showed how doctrinal products developed by the branch proponent are embedded and nested with strategic, operational, and tactical policy and doctrine, starting with the *National Security Strategy* and including the new Army FM 3-0, *Operations*. He provided the current status of several doctrinal CA publications, then discussed the following initiatives for FY23:

- Next April, the CA Doctrine Development Division will request feedback from the operational force and combat training centers on the value and utility of FM 3-57.
- The Division will work with PKSOI and the Army's Mission Command Center of Excellence on Army and Joint Doctrine for Military Government to close a critical knowledge gap in the uniformed services for shaping during competition and consolidation of gains.
- CA doctrine writers will support the Army's Campaign of Learning by observing CA forces in training events throughout the year and documenting the execution of the new mission essential tasks defined in FM 3-57 and related Army Technical Publications (ATPs).
- The Division will be working with the Army University Press and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth to develop audio and video products to supplement the existing written doctrinal publications for the continued education of the force.

Col. Jay Liddick, Director PKSOI, followed with an update on the key efforts of the Institute to "Shape, but Deliver." Since the CA Roundtable, PKSOI has led or contributed to the recent update and publication of JP 3-07, *Stabilization*, FM 3-0, *Operations*, and the new NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.28, *Stabilization* as well as the development of the new Army Operating Concept by the Army Futures Command's Futures and Concepts Center.

The Institute continues to expand, develop, and institutionalize the Joint Interagency Stabilization Course (JIASC) for planning stabilization at the operational and tactical levels and recently developed the Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS) Framework as a tool for stabilization practitioners. The Institute is playing a supporting role in executing the tenets of the Global Fragility Act (GFA) and, as the Army's office of primary responsibility (OPR) for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) and Protection of Civilians, is supporting the development of WPS strategy and the implementation of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP).

The Institute is also supporting U.S. European Command activities related to operations in Ukraine, assisting in the training of Army Security Force Assistance units at Fort Bragg, and supporting multiple efforts and initiatives of the CA Capability Manager and the CA Branch proponent. Finally, the Institute continues to support key Joint and Army Exercises within resource and time constraints and is developing a "Big Event" to replace two legacy events it once held pre-COVID – the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop (PSOTEW) held in the spring and the strategic seminars held in the fall.

Among the international organizations with which PKSOI maintains close ties are NATO's CCoE, and the Department of Peace Operations at the United Nations. CA personnel are ideal candidates for the Army's U.S. Military Observer Group, from which about 40 uniformed U.S. personnel are deployed every six months to be part of UN peace operations mission. CA Soldiers who participated in this mission gained vast situational awareness and understanding of international security operations as well as partner nations and militaries. It also helps build a unique global civil-military network to leverage for competition in integrated deterrence.

Mr. Anthony A. Weiss of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Office of the Deputy Commandant for Information (DCI) explained USMC CA force updates based on its integration with Operations in the Information Environment (OIE). He overviewed the DCI's Information Maneuver Division (IMD) that oversees USMC CA and reported the recently published Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP)-8, *Information*, identifying *Information Advantage* as composed of three elements: Systems Overmatch, Prevailing Narrative, and Force Resiliency. He explained how CA operates in all three areas, contributing to an Information Advantage for the commander. MCDP-8 defines a 21st century combined arms model consisting of information maneuver and information fires. IMD is collaborating with the Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS) to update Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 3-03A, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*, for civil affairs operations and CA planning, to be published by May of 2023.

With respect to USMC CA force design and personnel, USMC CA operational capability remains at three reserve CA Groups (CAGs). Still, a smaller CA planning capability resides across the USMC, even though it gained CA elements at the new Marine Littoral Regiments. Additionally, in an effort for professionalization, the Marine Corps recently created the 17XX Information Maneuver Occupational Field. The 17XX integrates the new active component 1707 Influence Officer and 1751 Influence Specialists MOSs, which require CA, PSYOP, and OIE qualification/training.

Lt. Col. Stefan Muehlich, Chief of Concepts, Interoperability, Capabilities at the CCoE in Den Haag, joined the Symposium from Berlin, Germany. He started by describing the new NATO definition of “Civil-Military Cooperation – CIMIC” and explaining how CIMIC is considered with maneuver, fires, and information as functions that take actions to create effects in NATO’s Joint Function Framework. However, with the new definition and the development of the analysis and assessment capability, CIMIC also clearly has an informing and directing role more akin to intelligence and command and control. He then described the newly defined term, Civil-Military Interaction (CMI), with civil-military liaison as its most sophisticated form. NATO’s eight cross-cutting topics (Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), Protection of Civilians (PoC), Cultural Property Protection (CPP), Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), Countering the Trafficking of Human Beings (C-THB), and Building Integrity (BI)—are now included in the capstone doctrine Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, which has recently been ratified and is about to be endorsed.

Another development is the dynamics of Human Security in Operations (HSIO), an umbrella term for Cross Cutting Topics and a major topic at the Madrid NATO Summit last summer. In addition, PoC was put under the spotlight in two high-profile actions, the U.S. Department of Defense’s publication of the CHMR-AP in August and NATO’s Bi-Strategic Command Directive 086-066 in September that reaffirmed NATO’s commitment to PoC. Lt. Col. Muehlich highlighted the new CCoE Study Paper that compares, contrasts, and critiques these papers and their relation to CA and CIMIC. Since July 2021, the 7th Army Training Command in Germany, has posted a U.S. CA Liaison Officer at the CCoE, with the intent of extending it another year while continuing work to make the U.S. a sponsoring nation with a permanent presence at the CCoE.

The 30-minute question-and-answer period that followed the presentations expanded on several workshop panel member discussion points and demonstrated the field’s great interest in the future of Civil Affairs. This discussion can be viewed on the *Eunomia Journal* YouTube channel.

Workshop II – Civil Affairs: Shaping in a Competitive Environment

The workshop after lunch on Day 1 featured Maj. Gen. Isaac Johnson, Jr., Commanding General of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), or USACAPOC(A). Col. Jason Arndt, who directs USACAPOC(A)’s Strategic Initiatives Group facilitated the workshop, in which Maj. Gen. Johnson shared his views of how Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) can shape the environment during the competition phase of conflict, in order to achieve enduring advantages. The advantages CAO provides, combined with other shaping operations, creates integrated deterrence, and prevents competition with adversaries from slipping into crisis or conflict. Maj. Gen. Johnson highlighted three USACAPOC(A) initiatives vital to transformation of USACAPOC(A) to more an information force than an information-related capability. First, he discussed the Army’s emerging Information Advantage (IA) concept. Second, he stressed his focus on customer service. Lastly, he highlighted the changes to the 38G military government specialist program.

Civil affairs forces are well-postured to adopt emerging IA concepts, primarily for two reasons. First, CA forces conducted several rounds of innovation during FY22 exercises, allowing better understanding of the core functions of IA and their application within the framework of USACAPOC(A) capabilities. Second, a CA force design update has been submitted, which provides the greater mix of specialties needed to completely perform core functions as envisioned by the IA concept. Another command priority Maj. Gen. Johnson discussed is an increased focus on customer service. His strategy of outreach and engagement with GCCs and Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) seeks to better understand the unique problem sets within the individual theaters. The shift in focus will also minimize ad-hoc force requests that don't fully employ unit capabilities. Additionally, the Regionally-Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model, or ReARMM, will provide a predictable force package each FY that is ready to deploy in support of our customers during competition.

As he noted at the Annual Meeting in October, his command emphasis is on an active sense of CA readiness for strategic competition to help USACAPOC(A)'s primary "customers"—geographic and service component commands—gain and maintain informational and other positional advantages vital to "winning without fighting" across the whole of the competition continuum. This especially includes providing unique and pivotal capabilities such as 38G military government specialists. The CG echoed USACAPOC(A) Cultural Programs Officer Col. Scott DeJesse's observation at the Annual Meeting that "Civil Affairs helps commanders deal with the complexity of the civilian world" by creating access, influence, and corresponding capacities through the networks they build. Properly trained and engaged in the regions, CA forces in general, and 38G personnel in particular, can help provide strategic warning in identifying civil threats to the strategic and operational environment, explaining the linkages, for example, between political and socioeconomic instability and national and international security concerns in those regions.

In order to mitigate the past experience of deployed CA forces in non-doctrinal "Frankenstein units," Maj. Gen. Johnson, upon taking command this year, immediately placed greater priority on the geographic and cultural realignment of CA commands (CACOMs) with other regionally aligned Army commands (including Security Force Assistance Brigades) and much more robust partnering with universities, partly to tap into their scientific knowledge and data for operations as well as to find new CA recruits for especially the 38G program.

The last point the CG made regarding Civil Affairs capability to shape competition and win without fighting involved the 38G military governance specialist program. As the program has matured, USACAPOC(A) is recruiting significantly more candidates for the program. The last panel considered almost 150 candidates and selected 74. These specialists allow CA units to contribute with PhD-level subject matter expertise to whole-of-government efforts to strengthen allies and partners. This engagement and integration, before crisis or conflict, builds strong relationships and networks which creates an enduring advantage for the U.S.

In addition to his thoughts on winning without fighting, MG Johnson shared news about *Operation Toy Drop 2.0*. This event will increase interoperability and readiness of airborne units within the command. In response to audience questions, he described his command philosophy, which relies on a balance between unit training and individual Soldier readiness. While he does not want to chase metrics, he expects leaders to take care of their Soldiers. He also described the benefits and advantages for USACAPOC(A) when leaders shift their focus to a customer-oriented mindset.

In response to another question, he recognized the challenges while noting the greater advantages inherent to being a Citizen-Soldier, juggling competing priorities, and dealing with complexity. Given how this is at the core of CA professional capacity, he stressed that there are opportunities for reserve component Soldiers to participate in advanced training courses and highlighted the need for individual self-development. Lastly, Maj. Gen. Johnson emphasized the many advantages of leveling the core CA curriculum between both active SOF and conventional reserve component CA generalists and the CA Corps in general, as Brig. Gen. Beaurpere noted in his presentation.

Among Maj. Gen. Johnson's remarks was his reiteration of his support for a more open relationship between USACAPOC(A) and the Civil Affairs Association. He extolled the many benefits the Association provides to both his command and its personnel on CA force and professional development as well as education and advocacy, the scholarship program, etc. He thanked the Association, for example, for providing the unique online convening platforms such as at the Symposium to communicate widely and simultaneously to a large swath of his command trace. He also noted how its awards program helps improve CA Corps identity and *esprit de corps*.

Workshop III – Civil Affairs Industrial Base: Wargaming Civil Affairs

How might Civil Affairs forces wargame and simulate the wide range of operations they perform across the globe? Col. Arnel P. David brought together Dr. Benjamin Jensen from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Dr. Thomas Nagle from Strategy Connections to address this question. Dr. Jensen is a Reserve Military Intelligence officer and Dr. Nagle retired as an Army Strategist. This annual workshop, which Col. David leads as a CA Association vice president, contributes to a wider effort to create an industrial base utilizing social sciences and information technologies for Civil Affairs force development.

Dr. Jensen opened with a review of a number of interesting gaming initiatives he is leading at CSIS and at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). As a professor at the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), he experimented with a variety of wargaming techniques, and some led to invitations to human security crisis gaming events in West Africa. These series of games collected data and worked with civil society organizations to help predict instability and alert of human security challenges. Dr. Jensen pointed out that “games become a synthetic environment in which you can try to replicate decision-making under uncertainty and the inherent trade-offs people have to make...expected utility and risk propensity.” He emphasized less is more and to focus on quality.

Discussing his strategic gaming platform, War Paths, Dr. Nagle reviewed why you might wargame CA operations. He made four key points:

1. Strategic arguments bring about cause and effect discussions.
2. It forces you to think through tertiary effects (2nd and 3rd order effects).
3. Games bring about more rigor which cause you to defend your assertions with justifications.
4. Wargaming CA operations may bring in opposing viewpoints to challenge your perspective.

His tool, War Paths, was used at a variety of levels, from operational to strategic and with diplomatic, grey zone, and special warfare operations. Col. David highlighted their use in the United Kingdom where the Secretary of State for Defence and his policy advisor participated in a large strategic-level matrix game. He went on to urge that this topic is important because “most of us professionals have an ethical obligation, whether you are in the military or are civilian, to think about how our operations and activities affect populations and other political entities.”

A rich discussion followed the presentations. In response to a question on how to integrate more of these types of games with low cost in time and other resources, Dr. Jensen offered that there are methods and tools that enable games that can be done in 30 minutes. There was a general sense toward the end of the discussion of a fear that the shift to great power competition will cause many organizations to ignore the hard lessons learned with stability operations and the counterinsurgency campaigns that have dominated the past two decades. The CA Corps needs to help retain this knowledge but also continue to use games to study and learn about these human phenomena further. If the CA force wants to hone its craft further, games can help.

No doubt the Proponent’s emerging Civil Affairs Science and Technology Learning Ecosystem (CASTLE) initiative should vigorously include wargaming and related experimentation, including interagency and interorganizational partners, to build both the capacities and capabilities the CA Corps will require to win without fighting.

Look for more discussion of related science and technology issues like this in the online *Eunomia Journal* and *OneCA* podcasts in the coming months.

Workshop IV – Interagency Perspectives on National Security and the Role of Civil Affairs

Day 2 of the Symposium opened with the interagency workshop to explore the role of the civil affairs community in the context of the new *National Security Strategy*, or NSS, closely followed by the *National Defense Strategy*, or NDS. Panelists included Mr. Paul Fritch, senior advisor to the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Mr. Aaron Roesch, acting deputy director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Policy in the Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning; and Major Jeffrey Chase, a U.S. Army civil affairs officer and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Liaison Officer to USAID. CA Association director Ryan McCannell, who is also a USAID Advisor to the Pentagon, moderated the session.

The NSS states the overall goal of the United States is for “a free, open, prosperous, and secure international order.” This capstone strategic document balances competition with the People’s Republic of China as the “pacing challenge” for the United States, and the near-term threat of Russian aggression, against the need for international cooperation on a range of transnational threats: climate change, global health, food insecurity, and countering terrorism and other forms of violent extremism. The NDS dives more deeply into the competition problem set, introducing a new concept of “integrated deterrence,” which accompanies campaigning and building enduring advantages as the three main lines of effort for the Department of Defense (DoD). As noted by Mr. Fritch, the two documents’ nuanced distinctions stem from their different scopes: the NSS is government-wide, whereas NDS is the SecDef’s document, designed to guide civilian policy makers in the Pentagon, the Joint Staff, the armed services, and combatant commands in how to allocate their resources and operationalize the NSS within the Defense community. The NSS implies that improved integration among agencies is necessary for both competition and transnational cooperation. In contrast, the NDS definition of integrated deterrence centers around streamlining DoD’s own vast array of stakeholders to counter a discrete range of threats.

Mr. Roesch noted that USAID collaborates with DoS on a joint strategic framework, and in USAID’s case, an agency-level policy framework that articulates how development assistance can contribute to the overall objectives of the NSS. These core documents link the NSS with the integrated country strategies and country development cooperation strategies developed by embassies and aid missions, ideally with inputs from Civil Affairs personnel attached to various posts or combatant commands. USAID also maintains a cadre of civil-military coordinators based at the Pentagon, GCCs, and a few TSOCs to improve defense-development coordination.

Maj. Chase plays a similar role in reverse, serving as a military liaison at USAID headquarters. He described how USSOUTHCOM’s overall goal is to build and strengthen ties with allies, interorganizational partners, and interagency partners at the State Department, USAID, and other U.S. government entities. As a GCC with no assigned forces, USSOUTHCOM places a high value on such partnerships, not only to compete with rivals and adversaries, but also to coordinate on things like migration, climate change, democratic backsliding, and security challenges.

The lively question-and-answer period featured an exploration of the nuances around “integrated deterrence” and perceived differences in the orientation of the NSS and NDS. For Civil Affairs, the growing cadre of 38G and 38S personnel can play a useful role in integrated deterrence to the extent that they understand what civilian agencies may already be doing in the governance space.

Both panelists and audience members expressed concern that a fixation on competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could crowd out other strategic imperatives and oversimplify the range of challenges policymakers and implementers face in various country contexts. The war on terror highlighted the dangers of focusing on one problem set to the detriment of other challenges like conflict prevention and stabilization. Likewise, a counter-PRC obsession risks alienating allies and partners that cannot afford an either/or choice between the PRC and the West.

As the warrior-diplomats of the Joint Force, Civil Affairs forces have a unique and important role to play in helping commanders and chiefs-of-mission navigate these strategic considerations. In that respect, the interagency panel aligned well with other roundtable sessions and this year's papers, since the NSS and NDS both reinforce an approach based on "winning without fighting."

Workshop V – Allied and Multinational Civil-Military Approaches to Winning without Fighting

Moving from the interagency to the international level, Association vice president Col. (Ret.) Christopher Holshek led a discussion of how allied and multinational civil-military partners may win without fighting. Participants were: Col. Stephanie Tutton, United Nations Office of Military Affairs; Dominique Gassauer, Civil-Military Coordination Section, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); Lt. Col. Stefan Muehlich, CCoE Branch Chief, Concepts Interoperability Capabilities; Lt. Col. Dave Allen, former U.K. Army Land Warfare Center Irregular Warfare/Engagement Doctrine; and Canadian Maj. Stuart Thomas, Deputy Chief of Information Operations, UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Col. (Ret.) Holshek began by pointing out how both NATO and U.S. policies are in an environment of strategic competition, hybrid warfare, and complex, multidimensional peace operations. They call for a greater employment of "military and non-military tools in a proportionate, coherent and integrated way to respond to all threats to our security in the manner, timing and in the domain of our choosing," per the *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept*. A critical component of American integrated deterrence, as depicted in the new *National Security Strategy*, is "integration with allies and partners through investments in interoperability and joint capability development, cooperative posture planning, and coordinated diplomatic and economic approaches." Nowhere, in fact, does "winning without fighting" find greatest positional advantage for the United States and its allies and partners than in the global civil-military network gained and maintained through the interallied and interorganizational system that the world's leading democracies have cultivated for generations. It is enabling the U.S. and NATO, for example, to play a decisive stand-off role in thwarting Russia's invasion of Ukraine and countering Chinese regional strategy.

Col. Tutton opened the United Nations discussion by reviewing how UN civil-military coordination is central to the integrated mission process, in which the military staff U-9 (UN-CIMIC) facilitates the interface between the military, police, and civilian components of UN field missions at the operational level at the mission headquarters. This civil-military network includes various UN and non-UN humanitarian and development partners, local authorities, donor agencies, non-governmental organizations, host national government, and civil-society organizations. UN-CIMIC, as a military staff function, contributes to winning the peace mainly through the UN-CIMIC analysis/estimate (CIV-OES) process. CIV-OES is the structured examination of all relevant civilian organizations' operational information in order to develop and share knowledge and support a shared understanding of the civilian dimension of the mission operational environment as well as to minimize adverse civil-military impacts.

Given how great power competitors like China and Russia—permanent members of the UN Security Council—have “weaponized” humanitarian assistance¹ and how climate change is driving larger and more frequent internationally coordinated humanitarian assistance and disaster relief situations, Ms. Gassauer provided a lengthy primer on the UN’s humanitarian civil-military coordination approach (UN CMCoord) and internationally recognized standards for humanitarian civil-military coordination. As the facilitator noted in his remarks, CA professionals must become more familiar with the frameworks in order to gain and maintain greater access and influence and the positional advantages that come with it.

At the same time, the “winning” part of “winning without fighting” in UN contexts has different motivation. In UN peace operations, this is sustainable, civilian-led peace and its political accommodation in affected civil societies. In especially multinational environments, CA professionals must understand and appreciate the exceptional sensitivities of military involvement in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief that UN CMCoord navigates. Driven by anything but a power dynamic, it is defined as “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals.” Rather than political gain, humanitarian response is premised on the adherence of all participants to the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity, and independence. Observance of these principles is critical for humanitarian actors to gain acceptance and access for relief operations, especially in situations of armed conflict.

The key elements of UN CMCoord are information sharing, task division, and planning. Its main tasks are to: establish and sustain dialogue with military forces and exchange information with them; assist in negotiating issues in critical areas of humanitarian civil-military coordination; support development and dissemination of country/context-specific guidelines; and observe activities to ensure distinction between humanitarian action and activities prioritizing security. Indirect rather than direct military humanitarian assistance has been found most preferable and effective, especially with respect to avoiding dependence on these forces for more than security. Common areas of appropriate military support to civilian humanitarian actors include: civil sector analysis (including damage assessments, etc.); opening and safeguarding lines of communication and supply on land, air, and sea; and the use of military assets to support humanitarian assessments and actions in hard-to-reach areas. Direct military humanitarian assistance actions in multinational settings are tempered by the “last resort” and “do no harm” principles found in the *Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief*. More information can also be found in OCHA’s 2018 *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook 2.0*.

Lt. Col. Muehlich followed with a deeper doctrinal discussion from Workshop I on the evolution of NATO CMI (civil-military integration) and CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) under the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC). In an information-intensive, people-centric competition continuum contextualized by the Comprehensive Approach, “winning without fighting” is strategic

¹ Natasha Hall and Hardin Lang, “The Weaponization of Humanitarian Aid,” *Foreign Affairs*, 9 January 2023.

shaping (rather than contesting or fighting) where the Alliance constantly looks to set more favorable conditions through a combination of diplomatic, information, military, economic elements of power. This comes through influencing and changing the behavior of potential adversaries and/or engaging with and supporting partners facing security challenges. To succeed in such a context, NATO militaries must develop and integrate military power to fulfill Warfare Development Imperatives along the lines of: influence and power projection; layered resilience (including civilian resilience); cognitive superiority (under the cognitive warfare concept); integrated multi-domain defense; and, cross-domain command.

CMI is “a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, mutually increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crisis.” CIMIC, in turn, is “a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors.” Civil-military liaison, support to the force, and support to non-military actors and the civil environment are its core functions. While CIMIC is the military capability that enables CMI, both enable the Comprehensive Approach with whole-of-government and whole-of-society efforts to enable layered resilience. The careful synchronization of military and non-military efforts is key. CIMIC, as a joint function, looks to fully integrate all elements of power at all levels in cross-domain convergence, cross-domain command, and integrated multi-domain defence, enabling commands to understand, shape, and exploit the operational environment.

In the meantime, CA-CIMIC synchronization remains an important topic to the CCOE, with even greater impetus in NATO rear areas in Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe in coordination with NATO assistance to member states tangential to Ukraine.

With the new Ministry of Defence (MoD) *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01*, British policy and national strategy under the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) takes an integrated approach similar to U.S. integrated deterrence or the NATO Comprehensive Approach. “Integrated Action,” Lt. Col. Allen explained, is the “audience-centric orchestration of military activities, across all operational domains, synchronised with non-military activities to influence the attitude and behaviour of selected audiences necessary to achieve successful outcomes.” However, although civil-military networks are essential to enabling comprehensive integrated action and civil-military outreach forces are seen as information forces, human security is increasingly fundamental to the British strategic sense of wider security as well as operational focus. MoD Joint Service Publication 985, *Human Security in Defence*, describes several human security considerations that, if ignored or compromised, are drivers of instability. Paramount to this understanding of human security is the principle of legitimacy.

In addition to an essential requirement with respect to the use of force, human security is essential to a compelling narrative to maintain U.K., its allies, and partner force legitimacy and campaign authority. JSP 985 adopts the human security model along the lines of cross-cutting themes. This

includes: the protection of civilians; women, peace, and security; conflict related sexual violence; modern slavery and human trafficking; preventing and countering violent extremism; children affected by armed conflict; building integrity and countering corruption; and cultural property protection. Integrated Action and the human security operational theme play large in British security force assistance in Ukraine, from where the MoD, in turn, is drawing important lessons on the applicability of these concepts to modern warfare.

As noted at the Annual Meeting, CA interoperability with CIMIC forces has been gaining traction, especially since the war in Ukraine broke out. As briefed at the Annual Meeting, the 353rd Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) is working more closely with NATO CIMIC partners and ramping up its engagement in Europe for numerous reasons, among them compensating for the gaps created by the disbanding of the Europe-resident 361st CA Brigade, which will complete its stand-down in 2023. This will ensure continued CA involvement in important NATO exercises such as *Atlantic Resolve* as well as form an important part of U.S. support to the European Defense Initiative. The 353rd CACOM is also providing CA forces in support of the newly reestablished U.S. Army V Corps, operating out of Poznan, Poland. This includes CA support to NATO CIMIC assistance to civil-military coordination of refugee relief efforts in Poland.

Against this backdrop, Maj. Thomas, at the recommendation of the Canadian Army's Influence Activities Task Force (IATF), provided a fascinating briefing on Canadian support to multinational CA-CIMIC cooperation through Task Force Poland—Maj. Thomas's duty assignment prior to his deployment to MINUSMA. Poland hosts over two million Ukrainian refugees—the majority of the more than three and a half million Ukrainians that fled to neighboring countries. Centered in the Warsaw area, the TF Poland effort includes continuous liaison with Polish government, military, and police authorities, OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, and other UN agencies in-country and the European Union Humanitarian Hub, as well as numerous NGOs. CIMIC tasks include: coordinating with these organizations to enhance common operating picture and identify NATO military assistance opportunities; conducting area civil assessments and civil information management; conducting CIMIC planning and integration; and conducting civil engagement.

With respect to the first three tasks, Maj. Thomas noted the effectiveness of the U.S. CA personnel at the Multi-National Civil-Military Operations and Coordination Center. The Canadian team has been especially active in providing linguist support, chaplains for spiritual and informed trauma care to Ukrainian Refugees at the reception centers, primary medical care support at the clinics at the reception centers, and movie nights and day care assistance to help refugee families find normality in their current situation. Additional tasks have included, for example, preparation, production, and distribution of Soldier information cards and facilitating translator support.

Maj. Thomas then took advantage of reporting from his current duty station in Bamako, Mali, to reinforce the earlier observations on the importance of understanding UN as well as NATO frameworks in multinational civil-military settings. He emphasized the mutual values-added of having NATO civil-military officers at UN field missions to enhance civil-military operations by

conducting tasks such as civil information management, key leader engagement, and UN-CIMIC operational assessments and integration.

Workshop VI – U.S. Marine Corps Fusion of Civil Affairs and Information

Moderated by Mr. James Jabinal from the Office of Information Operations Policy under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC), the panel consisted of Lt. Col. Jeremiah Root (1707 Influence Officer) from the Marine Corps Information Operations Center, Maj. Drake Toney (0530 Civil Affairs Officer) from the Force Headquarters Group, and Maj. Brad Hampton (1707 Influence Officer) who is the USMC representative to the Principal Information Operations Advisor Cross-Functional Team.

The discussion started with general thoughts on CA and PSYOP forces, the newly established USMC Influence MOSs, and how CA can contribute to Information as a Joint function. The 1707 Influence Officer and 1751 Influence Specialist are only applicable to the active component and require completing the Marine Corps Civil Affairs Course, the PSYOP Qualification Course, and a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) course.

The panelists provided great insight into how CA should be integrated with OIE for competition and influence. Not only is influence in the *National Security Strategy*, it is in the joint definition for Civil-Military Operations... “the activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI). CMO support U.S. objectives for host nation (HN) and regional stability.”

Integral to the conversation were feedback on how the USMC Reserve Civil Affairs Groups can integrate with OIE broadly and the future relationship between the Influence Marines and reserve component CA Marines. The information environment is rapidly evolving and it will be interesting to see what the Marine Corps contributes to OIE.

Civil Affairs Issue Papers

Closing out the Symposium, the authors of the five *Civil Affairs Issue Papers* selected to appear in this year’s volume presented and, through audience vote, competed for cash prizes of \$1,000 for first, \$500 for second, and \$250 for third. The winners were the first three of these papers:

- “The Power of the People: Civil Affairs and Civil Resistance” by Captain Daniel Moriarty
- “Reclaiming Civil Affairs as a Strategic Asset: Identifying ‘Deep Expertise’ for the Benefit of the Army” by Lieutenant Colonel JohnPaul LeCedre
- “Civil-Military Operations in the Age of Artificial Intelligence” by Major Tony Smith
- “Refining the Civil Affairs Value Proposition: Governance in the Modern Operation Environment,” by Captain John Wirges
- “Social Sciences Contribution to Civil Affairs,” by Captain John McLaughlin (who was unable to present his paper).

Issue Paper Committee Chairman retired Brig. Gen. Bruce Bingham noted that, as the Army and Marines face changes in strategic focus, equipment in advancing technology, and even different influences on Soldier training and behavior, “having our forum for discussing the Civil Affairs role in all this is more critical than ever.” In the finest tradition of Civil Affairs, he challenged CA NCO's, company and young field grade officers, “as well as the sage colonels” to put their knowledge to broader use through the annual *Issue Papers* challenge. “As the safety slogan says: If you see something, say something. Please share your experience and ideas with the Civil Affairs Corps, the Army and Marine Corps, and of course our allies and partners worldwide.”

The papers will be published, along with the final Symposium Report, in the ninth volume of the *Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, in early 2023. Authors will also discuss them more on the OneCA podcast. Previous volumes of the *Civil Affairs Issue Papers* and summaries of the current papers are also available on the Association website.

Final Remarks

Association President Col. (Ret.) Joe Kirlin closed out the two-day forum by thanking the CA community, its allies from around the world, and its organizational partners for their robust participation and partnership in helping the Association grow its resources as well as expand its convening role in interorganizational collaboration in order to promote a worldwide enterprise of civil-military enterprises. He also noted how Association platforms like the *Issue Papers*, Symposium, Roundtable, *OneCA* podcasts, *Eunomia Journal*, etc., continue to validate the enduring applicability of timeless CA Corps themes—how, as Lt. Gen Brunson put it at the Annual Meeting, “no military operation can be divorced from civil considerations;” the need to “secure the victory” in all environments, settings, and operations; and, how enterprises like CA have always been about “winning without fighting.” “For us, it’s always back to the future,” he noted.

As outgoing president, Col. (Ret.) Kirlin sees a great future for the worldwide civil-military enterprise—which, he noted, has always been about “winning without fighting”—given the greater openness of CA-related institutions like the proponent, USACAPOC(A), PKSOI, the JSOU and others to work closely on educating, advocating, and motivating the CA Corps as well as the greater cooperation between the Corps, the Association, and CIMIC allies and interorganizational partners.

Copies of the paper summaries, Symposium presentations, referenced documents, etc., are available for Association members in the “2022 Symposium” folder (under “Events”) in the Research Library (under “Resources”) on the Association website. Meanwhile, the entire Symposium discussion is available to watch on the *Eunomia Journal* YouTube channel.

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The Power of the People: Civil Affairs and Civil Resistance¹

Captain Daniel Moriarty

Introduction

In the early days of the Russian Federation's "special military operation" into Ukraine, kinetic action dominated the headlines. Could Russian forces reach Kyiv? Could they encircle Mariupol and possibly press northwards to cut off Ukrainian forces in Donbas? While the opening salvos were underway, meanwhile, a separate campaign also began: the nonviolent, civil component of the Ukrainian resistance. In just the first few months, civilians in Ukraine, Belarus, and even Russia demonstrated a variety of tactics that disrupted advancing forces, slowed the flow of logistics, and prevented gains from being easily consolidated.² On and off the front lines, the fearless resolve of Ukrainian civilians resonated in the information environment.

The most recent call for *Civil Affairs Issue Papers* points to the advantages that having strong civil-military networks may bring in a variety of contexts, to include large-scale combat operations (LSCO), irregular warfare (IW), and great power competition (GPC).³ Civil resistance supports all three, and indeed can answer the question of *how* those advantages are delivered in support of integrated deterrence. Civil Affairs (CA) forces must recognize both this potential and the opportunity for the CA Corps to establish itself as subject matter experts. By serving as the Army's "moral warriors who gain, maintain, and deny political, narrative, and perceptual positional advantages," CA forces are uniquely positioned to become as adept at supporting civil resistance campaigns as Special Forces (SF) are at supporting traditional unconventional warfare campaigns.⁴ Broadly ignored by military scholars, and framed by academia as a means for civilians to resist their own governments, civil resistance has extraordinary untapped potential to disrupt adversarial political or military objectives.

Current Special Operations Forces (SOF) perceptions of resistance focus almost exclusively on armed action, based on a long history of unconventional warfare using local partners. NATO SOF's "Resistance Operating Concept" (ROC) talks about the potential of civil resistance but does not provide prescriptive guidance on how it should be operationalized.⁵ This greatly undervalues the utility that nonviolent civil resistance can deliver, either as an integral element of military operations or as a stand-alone campaign. Accordingly, the execution of robust civil resistance campaigns supports the *National Defense Strategy's* concept of "integrated deterrence," offering the United States a dynamic and diverse form of imposing costs and building partner resilience.⁶

This paper highlights the core elements of civil resistance, including historical examples in which similar campaigns have succeeded in disrupting foreign occupation, toppling authoritarian regimes, and blocking destructive development projects. The paper then discusses the potential role for CA forces in supporting such movements before concluding with proposed changes to

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) that can initiate this transformation.

Historical Examples of Civil Resistance Across Multiple Contexts

Civil resistance (sometimes used interchangeably with nonviolent resistance or nonviolent direct action) has been used by a diverse array of movements across time and space, most commonly featuring civilians resisting their own predatory or authoritarian government. The most notable examples include large-scale campaigns with “maximalist” aims, such as the overthrow of an authoritarian regime or a massive shift in a societal status quo. Other cases include nonviolent components of wartime resistance against foreign occupation, while others still include overlooked examples of resistance to locally-rooted conditions of labor exploitation, ethnic or racial exclusion, corruption, and other issues. Cornerstone examples of maximalist civil resistance campaigns include Mahatma Gandhi’s movement for Indian independence from British control, the U.S. Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 60s, and the *Otpor* resistance in Serbia that led to the resignation of Slobodan Milosevic.

Gandhi’s movement against British colonial rule was waged over decades, including a series of targeted campaigns designed to build solidarity across a diverse Indian population while challenging British governance. Drawing from his travels through apartheid South Africa, and his study of other non-violent resistance movements, Gandhi chose to leverage civil resistance as a central pillar of the Indian independence movement. This was embodied in the 1930 Salt March, when Gandhi led tens of thousands of supporters on a 240-mile march to the Arabian Sea, to protest British laws against domestic salt production. Gandhi encouraged supporters to ignore the law and make their own salt, serving not only as a symbolic act of protest, but also directly disrupting British systems of economic control.⁷ Civic actions such as this built on each other in rapid succession, adding momentum to Gandhi’s movement that colonial administrators proved unable to counter. Efforts to arrest Gandhi only fueled his fame amongst Indians, furthering his transformation into a martyr-style figure who became massively popular and ultimately irrepressible, sitting at the head of a parallel government-in-waiting that would assume power in 1947 when India finally won its independence. Parallel institutions or “shadow governments” have since become an established element of resistance theory, including U.S. doctrine on unconventional warfare.⁸

While the U.S. Civil Rights movement of the 1950-60’s may not have had the same emancipatory aims as Gandhi, its aims of disrupting centuries of discrimination and systematic racism can be viewed as nearly as “maximalist.” Through the course of the movement, its members demonstrated the power of several styles of nonviolent means of resistance. In particular, the 1955-1956 Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott stands out as an example of deliberately planned and executed civil resistance to tremendous effect. Fueled by years of discrimination, and triggered by the dramatic arrest of Rosa Parks, the bus boycott was initially planned to last one day. It developed into a year-long campaign, however, coordinated by a

coalition of local and national organizations serving the local African-American community, who made up close to 75 percent of the city's bus passengers. The logistical demands for a continued boycott required frequent coordination between these groups, and ended in success when Montgomery made several concessions to the African-American community in reforming bus services.⁹ Similar victories across the South were vital to growing momentum for the movement as a whole, with boycotts, strikes, sit-ins, and demonstrations earning concessions from local governments and gaining popular support from large parts of American society; similar to conventional military operations, many of these acts of civil resistance involved deliberate planning, preparation, and training beforehand.¹⁰ The Civil Rights movement represents how national policy changes could be driven by a series of locally fought campaigns tied together through messaging and leadership from figures such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Following nearly a decade of bloody ethnic conflict across the Balkans, young Serbians frustrated with the militaristic regime of Slobodan Milosevic organized the *Otpor* (Serbian for "resistance") movement in 2000, with the aim of removing the autocratic leader through upcoming elections. *Otpor*, however, was not simply born in 2000, but was the result of nearly a decade of Serbian opposition movements debating and finally coalescing over a common goal and tactics of how to achieve it.¹¹ *Otpor* spent deliberate time and energy mobilizing diverse elements of Serbian society, seeking a wide array of supporters and participants in public acts of resistance. Such efforts paid off, as the movement trained thousands of activists and election monitors to observe attempts at vote rigging and had inspired hundreds of thousands of Serbians from diverse backgrounds to attend public demonstrations in Belgrade. Critically, while the success of *Otpor* was driven by the continued efforts of the Serbians who led it, some support to the movement also came from the United States. Notably, retired SF Colonel Robert Helvey was hired by NGOs to conduct training workshops in Hungary for *Otpor* leaders, and provided instruction on civil resistance planning principles and techniques for nonviolently challenging the Serbian regime. Additional support came in 1999, as NATO employed multiple FM transmitters around Serbia to broadcast anti-Milosevic messaging, countering state propaganda.¹²

Viewed over time and across geographies, civil resistance against foreign occupation has been a vital complement to armed elements or forces conducting unconventional warfare. During World War II, while the Allies worked with resistance members to stage daring sabotage campaigns across Nazi-occupied Europe, many other Europeans resisted nonviolently. In Norway, as commandos and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) personnel executed the famed raids on Nazi heavy-water production facilities, thousands of Norwegians found numerous ways to make the occupation an uneasy one for German forces. Acts of resistance included underground newspapers and radio channels that built solidarity across the population, "ice-front" campaigns that psychologically isolated German troops, teacher strikes that prevented the easy implementation of Nazi curriculums into Norwegian schools, and limited work-slowdowns that disrupted the extraction of natural resources to fuel the Nazi war machine.¹³ As pointed out in the beginning of this paper, civilians today are conducting many of the same actions against Russian

forces in Ukraine. While not as easy to quantify as the number of destroyed tanks or wounded soldiers, the effects of a resilient civil resistance movement in occupied Ukraine are noticeable, especially as they provide support to armed elements that have been conducting targeted sabotages and assassinations against collaborators.¹⁴

The Fundamental Advantages (And Disadvantages) of Civil Resistance

From these historical examples (and many others), one can observe some of the key components of effective civil resistance. Noted scholar Erica Chenoweth categorizes these as *mass (and diverse) participation*, *shifting regime supporter loyalties*, *variety of tactics*, and *resilience in the face of repression*.¹⁵ By examining these elements, we begin to identify some of the advantages (and disadvantages) of civil resistance over armed action.

Mass (and diverse) participation

One of the most intuitive differences between armed and civil resistance is that the latter can mobilize far greater numbers of participants. This is due largely to the lower “barrier of entry” for potential movement members. Whereas one must be willing and able to use violence and potentially kill opponents to serve as a guerrilla or insurgent, the requirements for civil resistance are far lower and therefore easier for mass engagement. Related to this is the diversity of civil resistance participants. Armed insurgencies or guerrilla movements often rely on young males to sustain their ranks, but civil resistance movements can leverage people from all walks of life, including women, children, the elderly, and members of religious or civil society organizations. Such diversity adds to the strength of the movement by legitimizing it as truly representative of the population, as well as making repression by security forces less likely.

During the 1980’s in the Philippines, the People Power movement challenged the corrupt regime of President Ferdinand Marcos. A flashpoint came in 1986: following an election stolen by Marcos, two battalions of Filipino soldiers defected and barricaded themselves in their bases near Manila.¹⁶ When Marcos ordered forces loyal to him to seize the bases, hundreds of thousands of People Power supporters mobilized and formed human barricades. These masses included several prominent church organizations, which proved vital. The dramatic images of Filipino nuns and priests standing shoulder-to-shoulder with activists and defecting troops carried a powerful message of Catholic solidarity with the movement. Marcos’ troops refused to fire on the crowds for fear of inflicting casualties on civilians and religious figures that led the communities of which many, themselves, were members. Soon after the event, the United States refused to continue its support of the regime, and Marcos fled the country.¹⁷

Shifting regime supporter loyalties

Another element of civil resistance is that it can elicit defections of regime supporters or security forces at a much higher degree than armed action. Similar to the vignette of the Filipino People Power movement, this trend has much to do with government forces’ hesitation in using violence against nonviolent civilians. Conversely, armed attacks by insurgent or guerilla groups can often

produce a rallying effect for opposing forces who then feel justified in the use of violence against civilian populations perceived to be supportive of armed elements. A 2018 study on the trend found that only 23.12 percent of nonviolent campaigns suffered a mass killing, compared to 68.15 percent of violent campaigns.¹⁸ Again, much of the advantage in shifting loyalties comes from a nonviolent movement's diversity and its roots and legitimacy within the society in question.

With a wider array of participants from across a society, civil resistance movements will typically have more avenues of access or influence into the pillars of support that uphold a regime or occupying force. The 2011 Arab Spring protests in Bahrain, for example, demonstrate one method that states have used to counter this phenomenon. Faced with a mass uprising of dissatisfied Shia (and Sunni, to a lesser degree), Bahrain received additional police support from Sunni allies in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. These outside forces, without personal connection to the population, had far less issue using violence to disrupt the protests.¹⁹ This also highlights a continuing area of research into the shortcomings of civil resistance; in areas where ethnicity or other identities divide a resisting population from security forces or regime supporters, the likelihood of pro-movement defections or loyalty shifts declines.²⁰

Variety of tactics

The diversity of civil resistance techniques and tactics has been widely examined. One of the preeminent scholars of civil resistance and nonviolence, the late Gene Sharp (1928-2018), was acclaimed for his "198 Methods" of nonviolent resistance. His observations can be categorized under the collective headings of:

- "Protest and persuasion" including highly visible and typical acts like marches, rallies, and other acts designed to grow support or awareness for a movement;
- "Noncooperation," including acts like labor strikes, boycotts, or establishing parallel governments; and
- "Intervention," including more confrontational tactics like hunger strikes, occupations of public spaces, or overloading administrative systems through mass arrests.²¹

Sharp's 198 Methods are not exhaustive and continue to be examined and adapted. Humor and creativity have also been strong ingredients to civil resistance's variety of tactics.²² One example of creative adaptiveness was the use of the *cacerolazos* protests in Chile during the 1970s and 1980s. Referring to the widespread banging of pots and pans, the act was initially used to highlight unrest over food shortages. However, as Chilean security forces became more repressive and cracked down on large gatherings of civilians, the *cacerolazos* were used by Chileans on balconies and windowsills. The ricocheting sounds served the same purpose of building solidarity across the resisting population without putting its members at the same level of physical risk.²³ This represents just one of many possible ways that civil resistance movements have creatively adapted tactics to fit their environment.

Resilience in the face of repression

A fourth component of effective civil resistance movements is nonviolent discipline and resilience in the face of repression. Nonviolent discipline refers to a movement's ability to withstand internal or external pressures to shift to a violent approach. Such pressure especially becomes strong after resistance members suffer violent repression by opposing forces; the urge by certain flanks to retaliate can threaten the unity of an entire movement. Movements that can maintain unity and avoid disintegrating into violent and nonviolent camps often do so due to a high degree of organization, leadership, and ideological adherence.²⁴ The importance of this discipline connects back to the previously discussed components, as avoiding violent responses to regime violence can make security force defections much more likely.

Nonviolent discipline also plays a critical role in building local and international support for the resistance movement. Known as the “backfire effect” or “aikido politics,” extreme violence by a regime or occupying force against nonviolent protestors can greatly alienate existing supporters of the regime, highlight the cause to an international audience, and act as a form of protection for high-profile leaders of a movement who might otherwise suffer continued acts of violence.²⁵ This effect has been greatly aided by the proliferation of social media, as resistance members have utilized such platforms to greatly increase the visibility of violent repression and hold security forces to greater accountability.²⁶

What Does This Look Like in LSCO, IW, and GPC?

While existing doctrine has greatly examined the role of armed resistance in different contexts, most notably the ROC, this section seeks to dedicate special attention to how civil resistance campaigns like those described could help achieve U.S. objectives across the three major areas of LSCO, IW, and GPC, as well as what potential CA support to each would look like. Much of the analysis here is a product of research on similar questions, in particular Major Travis Clemens' 2020 monograph for Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), *Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs in Great Power Competition*, and the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis of Command Sergeant Major Garric Banfield and Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Bleakley, “The Role of Civil Affairs in Unconventional Warfare.”²⁷ Additionally, Will Irwin's 2019 JSOU monograph *How Civil Resistance Works (And Why it Matters to SOF)* provides significant analysis on how (and why) U.S. SOF might support a civil resistance movement. Finally, Dr. Nicholas Krohley's unpublished handbook on the design and management of civil resistance operations offers an example of what prospective CA doctrine might look like.²⁸

Large-Scale Combat Operations

Taking many cues from the ongoing war in Ukraine, a civil resistance campaign amidst a large-scale conflict would be largely subordinate to armed components, whether friendly conventional forces, SOF, or members of a separate resistance organization. However, examples of nonviolent resistance elements during World War II also provide examples of how populations in occupied

areas might stymie invading forces. While doctrine on resistance does cover what actions a “public component” would likely perform in support of a guerrilla force, many other options exist.²⁹ For example, public dissent against proposed annexation referendums in occupied areas of Ukraine continue to disrupt Russian aims for an easy political consolidation, undercutting the narrative of genuine public support for such measures. Beyond disrupting political aims, civil resistance networks can have effects on military objectives or operations. Particularly, deliberate sabotage or labor strikes by key workers in areas such as transportation (such as the acts of Belarusian railway workers) or infrastructure like power plants can create new drains on occupying forces.³⁰ Additionally, acts of social noncooperation like the caching of foodstuffs would further ostracize invading troops and prevent the kind of looting that has been widely seen in areas of Ukraine under Russian control.

In such scenarios, CA forces would be able to serve as a source of pre-conflict training, utilizing civil networks to build awareness and competencies of civil resistance techniques and tactics that would be employed along with armed components in the event of an invasion. Within the case studies examined above, the *intentionality* of civil resistance was vital to its success. Spontaneous acts of civil resistance can create effects that resonate on the battlefield, as evidenced in Ukraine thus far—but a sustained, deliberate campaign requires substantive planning, coordination, oversight, and risk management. Similar activities were carried out by select CA elements in Ukraine prior to the Russian invasion, focusing on promoting resilience and enhancing existing civil networks’ abilities to support national defense.³¹

There is a key potential role, therefore, for CA forces to provide structured process and method to local partners so that they can leverage civil resistance to its maximum potential. During a period of active conflict in which U.S. forces are deployed, CA forces could also be employed to maintain a liaison and support function for civil resistance elements in occupied territories; such work would be vital to sustaining the movement and coordinating unity of efforts with adjacent armed resistance elements.

Important to consider as well is the role of reserve CA forces during such operations. While much of this discussion on civil resistance has focused on its use as an approach to disrupting adversarial forces, it can likewise be used by adversaries to disrupt friendly forces within consolidation areas in many of the same ways. Reserve and conventional CA forces have understood their role during large scale combat operations as primarily focused on establishing civil control in the consolidation area.³² Reserve CA forces trained and educated in civil resistance would be far more capable of detecting and defeating enemy attempts to use nonviolent action to disrupt friendly consolidation areas.

Irregular Warfare

Within the scope of irregular and unconventional warfare, civil resistance campaigns have the potential to either support parallel armed resistance elements or stand on their own to achieve certain objectives (particularly in the information environment). In the former, historical analysis

has documented how SOF elements like CA can “use civic action to strengthen leaders, build popular support, and sustain a guerilla force.”³³ Nevertheless, as the preceding discussion has demonstrated, the common objectives of unconventional warfare campaigns, the destabilization or overthrow of an unfriendly regime or occupying force, can be achieved through nonviolent means under the right circumstances. Following the example of the “maximalist” campaigns of Gandhi, *Otpor*, and many others, civil resistance can achieve many of the same objectives as a traditional guerilla warfare campaign without requiring the same levels of military aid or direct SOF support.

However, this is not without its own challenges; while civil resistance campaigns have historically enjoyed higher levels of success than armed campaigns, they often last much longer in time than those movements that rely on violence.³⁴ The prospect of providing foreign support to civil nonviolent movements presents additional threats. Accusations of U.S. or Western-backed “color revolutions” are commonly leveled at resistance movements when evidence of foreign support is found, which threaten the credibility and legitimacy of the movement itself.³⁵ A recent report by the International Center for Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC) focused on such a dilemma, finding that the most effective forms of external support to nonviolent campaigns are capacity building or training on the core components of civil resistance discussed previously. Additionally, the report found that the best timeframe for delivering such training was before the period of peak mobilization.³⁶ As for how CA forces would be able to support such civil resistance elements in this context, Major Travis Clemens’ Joint Special Operations University monograph provides a succinct discussion:

STR [support to resistance] is a narrow role in the range of military operations and SOF CA’s piece of STR is narrower still, but that does not discredit the importance of SOF CA’s key role as a part of STR. Certain skills necessary to create an effective resistance fall solely within the training and doctrine of CA. The most relevant of these is CIM [civil information management] and CR [civil reconnaissance]. As closely engaged as they are with the civil population, SOF CA elements could passively detect and report any indications of nascent resistance—especially civil resistance—in a host country. In this respect, they could be prime contributors to a formal assessment of resistance potential in a country.³⁷

Clearly, CA elements have neither the manpower nor the ability for much more than conducting such assessments or providing limited training to key organizations or elements of a civil resistance movement. Indeed, the most effective civil resistance movements are home-grown and should not require substantial direction from external support. That said, CA forces should be knowledgeable in how civil resistance fits within irregular warfare and understand how they might support a particular movement. They could also readily provide structured processes and methods for the deliberate operationalization of civil resistance by foreign partner forces.

Great Power Competition

Civil resistance movements offer an intriguing set of policy options in the context of great-power competition. Whereas the most studied civil resistance campaigns are those with maximalist aims, lower-profile and lower-ambition civic movements have used similar tactics to resist states like Russia and China as forms of competition below armed conflict. Labor movements striking for better pay or working conditions and indigenous groups conducting resistance campaigns against natural resource extraction stand out as notable examples. A 2021 report, for example, found that Chinese investment sites in Africa were more likely to be the targets of protests than sites with investment from any other nationality.³⁸

There is, of course, inherent risk to U.S. support to civil resistance in this context, as many states openly welcome the economic investment of a state like China. Attempts at “meddling” in the internal economic affairs could very well play into the hands of such competitor states. However, the capability for motivated grassroots movements to at least disrupt these types of projects should not be discounted and merits discussion (with Department of State and other interagency partners) as a potential addition to proposed U.S. responses to competitor actions. CA forces operating as civil-military support elements (CMSEs) could perform a similar function as in IW, passively noting areas of contention over labor or encroaching influence that have the potential to grow and create dilemmas for competitor states.

Recommendations

Based on the discussion and analysis, three main DOTMLPF-P recommendations emerge for how the CA branch can develop subject matter expertise in civil resistance and establish itself as the Army’s specialists in assessing and supporting such movements:

Doctrine—Develop Specific Publications on Civil Resistance and CA Support to Civil Resistance

As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, existing doctrine on resistance is lacking with respect to the supporting role and standalone potential of civil resistance activity. The ROC, while exceptional in its scope and scale, only dedicates nine pages specifically to nonviolent resistance (although the “public component” of resistance organizations is featured throughout).³⁹ Other publications, such as Army Training Publication (ATP) 3-18.1, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, dedicates only 15 pages out of a total of 574 specifically to nonviolent resistance. ATP 3-18.1 does acknowledge, however, that “in some instances, support to a civil or nonviolent resistance movement may be capable of furthering or accomplishing U.S. goals without the occurrence of an armed struggle.”⁴⁰ And while this and other doctrinal publications prescribe the ways in which CA may conduct STR activities for an armed movement, no publication exists specifically focused on civil or nonviolent resistance.

Put another way, there is notable literature within the U.S. military that talks *about* the potential of civil resistance, but precious little that details how it should be operationalized. Producing

such documents (drawing from the above-noted work of Clemens and Krohley) would further the knowledge of CA and other SOF elements on the topic, provide a consistent and scalable approach that could be shared with foreign partners, and facilitate improved training and analysis in operational settings.

As a secondary benefit, the production of dedicated civil resistance doctrine would likely involve a high degree of networking with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC) and United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Expanding professional connections with relevant NGOs and other institutions would thus serve as opportunities to grow CA's global civil-military network.

Training—Dedicated Civil Resistance Training or Courses

While developing doctrinal foundations for understanding civil resistance movements is critical, also important is the functional training of CA and other SOF in how to understand, assess, and prepare to support them. No formal course on the topic exists; JSOU's National Resistance Course dedicates only one session to nonviolence, and the CA Qualification Course (CAQC) dedicates just a few hours to introducing the concepts.⁴¹ Instead, training has been offered by private companies on an ad-hoc basis and with irregular availability. Developing either a dedicated module for students in the CAQC or a standalone course dedicated to civil resistance for SOF would enable a much wider shared understanding and directly improve CA forces' abilities. A potential training course would examine the historical examples, core components, and tactical diversity already presented in this paper.

Additional instruction would provide a framework for how "civil resistance operations" might be planned and coordinated with indigenous partners in support of a larger-scale objective. Importantly, offering this training to both SOF and reserve CA (through online or distance platforms) and including certain 38G functional specialists related to civil administration would support efforts to improve parity in training and education and thus civil resistance support capacity across the CA Corps.

Leadership & Education—Civilian Graduate Education, Broadening Opportunities

Finally, the CA branch proponent should seek to expand opportunities for civilian graduate education and engagements with subject matter experts across the active and reserve components. Many universities contain courses on social movements, nonviolent resistance, and⁴² even if manpower restrictions limit the number of CA officers who can pursue such education, auditing or observing relevant classes or lectures can provide diverse learning opportunities.

Developing positive professional connections between the Civil Affairs Corps and these institutions will further grow the community's global civil-military network. Beyond academia, conducting training with relevant organizations such as the ICNC, USIP, or local groups with experience in running nonviolent campaigns can broaden CA forces' frame of reference for what civil resistance may look like.

Conclusion

Civil resistance has been chronically understudied within U.S. SOF and CA. Despite its historically higher success rates than armed resistance or insurgent campaigns, it occupies a marginal space in military publications on resistance. The advantages of civil resistance merit specific study and consideration when discussing SOF support to civil resistance. Understanding how and when this type of movement is more feasible than a traditional SOF-supported armed resistance will increase the United States' abilities to achieve its national security objectives and achieve integrated deterrence against its competitors.

As the Army's experts in the human dimension of multi-domain operations, the CA Corps must recognize this and take the necessary steps to establish itself as subject matter experts on civil resistance. Leveraging its global civil-military network, CA leaders can grow the force's abilities while simultaneously creating new connections with organizations and institutions that have studied and conducted civil resistance campaigns in a variety of locations and contexts. Doing so will support ongoing objectives of achieving integrated deterrence in this new age of global security challenges.

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Endnotes

¹ Special thanks to Dr. Nicholas Krohley, Ph.D., in developing this paper's arguments and refining its presentation. Dr. Krohley is the founder of Frontline Advisory, and proprietor of www.civilreconnaissance.com.

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Reclaiming Civil Affairs as a Strategic Asset: Identifying and Categorizing Deep Expertise for the Benefit of the Army

Lieutenant Colonel JohnPaul LeCedre

Introduction

Commanders have needed to engage civil authorities and populations strategically during virtually every conflict in the history of warfare. Engaging the civil component requires “deep expertise”—the type most often gained from years at academic institutions, industry experience, and civilian-acquired knowledge, skills, and perspectives. The United States Army has a ready-made structure for providing these means to the theater commander in the Civil Affairs (CA) Corps. The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), specifically, the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), or USACAPOC(A), provides nearly 76% of all Department of Defense (DoD) CA assets.¹ The USAR is home to all but one of the ten Army CA brigades.² This preponderance of force structure makes the command the ready-made forces with a catalogue of civilian-acquired deep expertise the Army needs to win without fighting across the competition continuum and for integrated deterrence.

With a two-star level national command, four one-star level regionally-aligned civil affairs commands (CACOMs), numerous brigades, and dozens of battalions, USACAPOC(A) has all of the right framework to provide this capability to the strategic commander; however, the command has fallen short in providing deep expertise in manning, despite several well-intentioned and audacious organizational changes over the previous two decades. This paper seeks to identify causes of a “strategic means gap” facing the CA Corps in the post-Afghanistan framework, how it can provide more ready strategic assets to combatant commanders, and how structural changes can provide increased capacity to strategic level commanders.

Civil Affairs in a Post-Afghanistan Framework

In the over 30 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, CA units have been employed predominantly as a reactive force. It has been largely used following major conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan to “help restore order to civil society, rebuild, and grow lasting relationships with civil actors.”³ CA operations have been treated as an adjunct to security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, countering insurgencies that developed as a result of large-scale operations during the Global War on Terror.

No longer significantly involved in either of the two former theaters of the War on Terror, today’s CA Corps “support[s] relationships with allies and partners through theater security cooperation, disaster response and other, largely peaceful efforts not tied to armed operations.”⁴ The 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance identified China and Russia as “growing rivalries”⁵ and emphasized the “responsible use of our military, while elevating diplomacy as our tool of first

resort.”⁶ The 2022 *National Security Strategy* follows up by prescribing “working with governments, civil society, independent media, and the private sector,” a task ideally suited for supporting and coordinating military forces such as CA.⁷ The same document espouses the use of partnering “with the private sector, philanthropy, diaspora communities, and civil society,” all of which require levels of deep expertise found in the CA Corps, which is not mentioned.⁸

The Department of Defense, whose funding dwarfs that of the Department of State, is well-positioned to counter Chinese and Russian aspirations abroad, under strategic competition, with improved engagement with CA assets.⁹ Despite this, the national security guidance has produced precious little military strategic guidance for the employment of civil-military assets precisely when they will become more critical to the theater-level commander. The 2018 *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning* concedes that the Joint Force has “institutional remnants of the obsolete peace/war binary conception of the operating environment” and that accomplishing “policy aims is an inherent element of campaigning in armed conflict as well as an essential facet of campaigning outside of armed conflict,” yet the document fails to mention DoD CA at all.¹⁰

The current generation of military leaders, most beginning service after the end of the Cold War, has experienced CA as a tactical or operational asset assisting battalions and brigades in establishing security in places like Baghdad and the provinces of Afghanistan. Moving forward, the CA Corps needs to shift in order to better organize and recruit Soldiers whose skills, civilian experiences, and deep cultural knowledge meet strategic requirements while lowering barriers to entry. Doing so will lessen the current “strategic means gap” and better posture the Corps to have utility in a new multi-polar geopolitical reality.

Instead of attributing the lack of mention of CA as a strategic asset within major strategic documents to a failure of understanding among the authors, the CA Corps must recognize the oversight stems largely from a failure to provide significant strategic CA capabilities since at least the Cold War. Strategic level capabilities within the often-niche specialties of CA require a depth of knowledge and experience that must necessarily be supplemented or entirely learned outside of military institutional training. Providing combatant commanders high-level cultural and technical specialties should be among the highest priorities of the branch. In order to do so, leaders should shift to a hybrid of the “train from within” and “recruit from outside” models—that is, there should be focus on lowering barriers to entry for exceptionally talented individuals and increasing meaningful incentives to entry for high-skill reservists whose civilian occupations may make them less likely than other reservists to continue service.

Specifically, the CA branch proponent and Corps should: one, narrow the current 38G officer military occupational specialty (MOS) to direct appointments and commissions of high-skill individuals without prior experience as Army officers and recharacterize functional specialists as branch immaterial assignments with a robust skill identifier (SI) program; and two, provide more meaningful incentives to retain such highly skilled officers.

The Strategic Means Gap: Identifying Existing Deep Expertise in the Army

The 38G Area of Concentration (AOC), Military Government was approved by HQDA 25 November 2013 to “identify duties, functions, positions and personnel requiring qualifications in Military Government.”¹¹¹² In envisioning the 38G program, the leaders of USACAPOC(A) had the right idea: they intended to create a pathway to commissioning for high-skill civilians and enlisted Soldiers in a limited duty capacity.¹³ The original concept, envisioned creation of a specialty corps similar to other specialty corps in the Army’s inventory. Creation of such a corps would have ostensibly given the USACAPOC(A) Commander the flexibility to direct commission degreed and experienced professionals against the required standards for this corps.¹⁴ It took more than seven years after the program was envisioned for the first direct appointee to be sworn into the CA Corps.¹⁵ The authority to direct commission as 38G officers was not granted until September of 2019.¹⁶ This first direct appointee, however, was not the first 38G.

In the intervening years, in order to fill a gap of 38Gs newly added to the reserve force structure, currently serving officers were designated with the 38G career field to attempt to fill newly created 38G vacancies. These vacancies have existed for years within CA battalions, with more substantial allocations at brigade and CACOM levels and have been effectively masked by a temporary waiver allowing for CA generalist officers (AOC 38A) to serve in those positions. In the intervening seven years, the proponent has held one to two selection boards per year in order to mint these 38G transfers. These boards have centralized the selection at the highest level, which limits a commander’s ability to recruit, tailor, and develop 38G officers, much less plan for their career progression at a reasonable pace. The structural problems of this program thus begin at the genesis of the 38G career path.

A Laborious and Protracted Implementation

Back in 2013, when the 38G program was originally brought to fruition, the mechanisms for direct commissioning and direct appointments were not in place. Contrary to the original intent of the program, the 38G career field was opened to existing AOC-qualified officers for branch transfer.¹⁷ It is difficult to understate how much that decision has undermined the original purpose of the 38G program. The fundamental structural error is this: the 38G model was intended to be *an additional source* of deep expertise within the CA Corps—from outside of normal channels of recruitment—not the *sole source* of deep expertise. By necessitating a branch transfer (thereby making it infeasible for officers with existing deep expertise to consider governance as a broadening assignment), the existing 38G model subverts the original intent of the program by raising the bar to entry for a program that was intended to broaden how the Army accesses deep expertise.

The numbers bear out the assertion above. Within USACAPOC(A) (the only command currently authorized 38Gs), there are 557 38G-coded duty positions.¹⁸ From the outset of the program in 2015 until 2020, there was never more than a 7-8% fill of those coded positions, all of which were

branch transfers of existing USAR officers.¹⁹ Currently, due to some very focused and dedicated recruitment from the existing development managers, the number of filled duty positions has increased to approximately 80, or 14-15% of all coded positions.²⁰ It follows that over 7 years after the implementation of the program, the vast majority (over 80%) of 38G positions are filled by 38As or unfilled altogether. This utilization gap does not reflect a lack of talent; rather, it reflects a lack of proper program design and, to a lesser extent, implementation of the existing design, as discussed below.

There Is No Definitively Published 38G Career Progression Document

Even when newly minted 38G officers have surmounted the difficult barriers to entry into the program, they have found that published doctrine on the 38G career field is sparse. Existing career progression documents state that “there are no identified developmental assignments for an MG officer.”²¹ Officers who are considering this career field are thus doing so without any published guidance on how their positions and experience may develop and progress over the course of their careers. The 38G program, when implemented, floundered forward with “no published doctrine and no defined recruiting processes.”²² These officers are left to infer 38G career paths from identified 38G positions within the various MTOE documents of USAR CA battalions, brigades, and commands. As military government specialists, these officers are presumably specialists and leaders within their fields. Without appropriate career field or lifecycle management, the 38G proponent is simultaneously attempting to recruit some of the most educated and experienced personnel into the 38G career field but asking those same personnel to do so with no official guide with which to plan their careers.

When the 38G branch was developed and implemented, the career lifecycle documents should have been developed and released contemporaneously with the implementation of the branch itself—at least in a proposed status. Much as the reserve and active career models documents have been updated and fine-tuned over the course of the previous years and experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and otherwise. The lack of career progression guidance has made it difficult to impossible for potential 38G officers to plan their careers. It has equally prevented reserve component (RC) commanders from being able to articulate to potential officers’ reasons for joining the branch or for commanders and senior staff to perform long-term planning involving these capabilities.

Primary Recommendation: Narrow the 38G AOC in Favor of Robust Additional Skill Identifiers

The Current 38G AOC Conflates Strategic Need with Strategic Capability

The 38G career field, as a means for bringing uniquely civilian specialist capacities into commissioned military service, is a laudable and useful idea—to create the capability within the Army to do what CA is doctrinally capable of doing.”²³ The 38G AOC, which is currently the sole

mechanism to deliver that capability, is unnecessarily stifling the ability of the CA Corps to meet the strategic need. For existing commissioned officers who already possess qualifying high skills, there is no need to award these officers an AOC. The skill-classification mechanism for specialists who are 38G and any other AOC already exists: the SI. SIs can and should be used to classify all types of officers to categorize both type and level of skill. The 38G program should be limited to direct appointees and directly commissioned for specific duties related to their high-value skills. The 38G AOC should be one means of entry into the field, not the sole means of entry.

By insisting that any officer serving as functional specialists must necessarily hold the 38G AOC, the program has self-imposed a serious structural flaw at its outset. Rather than be segregated into a different career field, functional specialists should be designated within the force structure as a branch immaterial duty position (01A / BI), retaining the specific SIs currently used by the 38G designation board.²⁴

Using SIs to Eliminate a Superfluous Bar to Entry

As it stands, making 38Gs the sole source of deep expertise unnecessarily disjoins the CA officer corps and has created a superfluous bar to entry with a development model that relies on a selection board that meets intermittently, applying often unclear standards to produce 38Gs. Perhaps the significant distinguishing factor of the RC at large is the wide variety of civilian skills and experiences that could potentially be brought to bear by the identification and integration of as many of these skillsets as possible.

A program to recruit military government specialists for use within the CA Corps should begin with a simple and decentralized way to identify those with the skills needed for specific commands. This challenge may be addressed by establishing clear educational and experiential guidelines for the various SIs associated with military government specialists. The approval level of these SIs should be delegated to the first general officer commander in the officer's chain of command, most often one of the four CACOM commanders. This would eliminate the issue of needing a separate career development model for 38Gs, reduce the time and requirement barrier to entry, allowing the CACOM commanding general to tailor recruitment to his/her specific needs, and allow officers who were not interested in CA as a permanent career field to pursue assignments as valuable broadening opportunities.

Military government SIs, unlike most others in the Army, generally reflect skills earned outside of service, as opposed to institutional training. Such an SI "does not confer a skill, it recognizes it."²⁵ The board process should thus err on the side of award of the SI, rather than the withholding of it. Once identified, commanders and other assigned specialists could perform any mission-dependent personal vetting of the qualified officers. The vetting of these skills, which are extremely specialized and varied, is best suited for an individualized and decentralized approach. The current centralization of the process has created an extreme backlog and lack of responsiveness in

developing required strategic needs. “Civilian experience in particular career field does not necessarily translate to a strategic skill.”²⁶ Commanders at a level lower than the proponent are in the better position to identify, recognize, and allocate individualized civilian skills with appropriate career progression and development documents.

The proliferation of these SIs would allow commands in need of such specialties to use existing personnel databases to quickly identify potentially qualified officers and more easily recruit within the USAR or from the Army National Guard (ARNG). While the delegation of this ability would admittedly cause the award of the SIs to be less uniform, this irregularity could be countered by clear published policy guidance on the award of the SI and better training of the personnel specialists administering the SI program. In the worst case, inconsistencies in the award of the SIs would be incidental and would not present nearly as much of a hinderance to the strategic value program as the current widespread lack of qualified military government officers.

Further, if the SI program were properly implemented, the 38G AOC would be properly focused to identifying and commissioning highly-skilled civilians and enlisted Soldiers for immediate service as commissioned military government specialists. Officers who are already commissioned would apply for the SIs, ideally as part of an entry and further personnel review questionnaire. SI-qualified officers would and should be liberally encouraged to transfer and serve in military government specialist positions as broadening assignments during their normal career progression. Efficiently leveraging the wide range of civilian skillsets among RC officers involves lowering the barrier of entry for this program. This means that qualified USAR officers could apply their skillsets within the CA Corps in between other lucrative opportunities within their branches, such as command and critical staff roles, without abandoning career aspirations as a dedicated 38G officer. Similarly, ARNG officers could obtain the SIs and be recruited to fill current 38G roles without having go through the arduous process of transferring AOCs.

Within the CA Corps, officers already 38A-qualified are commonly discouraged from obtaining the 38G branch as it is deemed superfluous for officers who are already CA “generalists” and still qualified for command positions within the Corps. Rather than a discrete career field, the military government program should be treated as a reserve pool of identified civilian specialists within the USAR to augment and fulfill the strategic mission of the USAR CA force.

International Law Officers (A Microcosm of an Institutional Issue)

Similar to the current structure of 38G positions within the various units of the USAR CA force, the current MTOE structure assignment of Judge Advocate (27A) officers as International Law Officers (ILOs) within the battalions, brigades, and commands imposes an unnecessary bar to entry for said officers. The ILO is not the commander’s Staff Judge Advocate, i.e., he or she does not advise the commander on legal matters affecting the operations of the command. There is no practical purpose for the requirement that these attorneys be practicing Judge Advocates. The ILO

position is unlike a Staff Judge Advocate, whose duties involve providing legal advice to the commander. While most of the legal specialists in the Army are indeed JAGs, this designation excludes a significant number of officers who are attorneys, but have chosen an operational or otherwise non-legal branch for their reserve service (the author of this article is included among them). The requirement that the ILO be a 27A is thus under-inclusive.

On the contrary, the MTOE specification that any 27A may assume the role of ILO assumes that any qualified 27A has international law expertise—this designation is thus over-inclusive and allows for ILOs who may be attorneys, but have no relevant deep expertise at all. In order to correct this inconsistency and provide for a more diverse and available force pool for ILOs, the position should be coded as branch immaterial with a designated SI for a specialty in international law. As stated above, the skills necessary to perform the required strategic need are nearly always those conferred outside of military training. While it may be a reasonable conclusion that 27A / JAG officers likely possess a significant pool of the required expertise, using the AOC model would yet again impose an unnecessary restriction to developing the desired strategic capability.

AMEDD Specialty Officers

Just as is the case with ILOs, the current MTOE for a CA battalion allows for the assignment of a “Preventative Medicine Officer” (60C). This is needlessly underinclusive. In addition to use as a medical practitioner, a CA unit commander must have the capability to advise a supported commander on issues of public health, as is readily apparent given the effects of the worldwide pandemic beginning in 2020. The MTOE should thus be redesignated to an AMEDD immaterial officer (05A) to allow the commander to leverage an AMEDD officer’s unique civilian specialties for the accomplishment of the mission.

The need for medical field specialists is highly mission-dependent. For example, the enduring obligations currently provided by the CA Corps requires USAR Soldiers to provide recurring expertise on agricultural and veterinary issues. As a result, assigned veterinarian officers are highly sought-after and often double- or triple-slotted to positions and taken to long tour deployments as mission-essential. Allowing specialists to be generally branch immaterial or AMEDD branch immaterial would permit a more mission-focused approach to recruiting.

Summary of Proposed Changes to the 38G / SI Model

In order to widen the pool of available military government specialists, the 38G AOC should be narrowed in favor of branch immaterial functional specialty teams with SIs awarded by general officers within the command. ILOs should also be coded as branch immaterial with a new SI that would incorporate JAGs, as well as civilian lawyers, with relevant international law experience. Similarly, AMEDD officers within the functional specialty team should be coded AMEDD branch immaterial to give the commander the ability to recruit more broadly in order to foster a more specific mission capability.

Preliminary DOTMLPF-P Implications of a Narrowed 38G / Robust SI Model

“The Army solves systemic problems using the DOTMLPF-P construct: doctrine, organization training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy.”²⁷ This process is the framework to determine and refine the strategic needs for the military force.²⁸ The capability gap analysis below is meant as a preliminary determination, does not cover all elements of the DOTMLPF-P framework, and is not to be taken as complete.

Doctrine: The development of doctrine for branch immaterial SI officers would be similar, if not almost identical, to any proposed 38G career field doctrine. The issues of employment of these civilian skill specialists are highly dependent within the specific commands and geographic areas; thus, the challenge is best suited towards unit-level training rather than overinclusive addition of centralized doctrine.

Organization: All positions that are currently coded as 38G or ILO would be re-coded to 01A, retaining the SIs currently on the MTOE, with minor refinements as necessary. The implementation of this specialty should start at the CACOM level to allow for officers to be first overseen and integrated at strategic levels—where they are most likely to have immediate impact. AMEDD slots would be re-coded as 05A.

Training: The training for the new SIs should be focused on doctrine and planning skill, rather than specific skills training, which the military government specialists would necessarily already have. This training could be implemented through Distance Learning (DL), as there would be no pressing need to have courses in person for this type of non-tactical training. This would alleviate the time pressures on the newly-recruited military government specialist.

Material– Because the newly created branch immaterial positions would be converted from existing 38G and 27A positions, there would presumably be no new requirements from the current force structure.

Leadership and Education– Officers being designated as branch immaterial would follow their normal institutional professional military education (PME) without the need for a new designation. This would be benefit to those officers who wish to serve within the functional specialty teams as a broadening assignment in between more convention branch assignments.

Personnel– Allowing the liberal award of military government specialist SIs across the RC would presumably develop a large reserve force pool of potential specialists, sufficient to satisfy the current authorized force structure for currently designated 38G and 27A/ILO positions. Current operations and doctrine would dictate future adjustments to personnel.

Supplemental Recommendation: Establish Skill-Based Incentives

Recruiting quality CA officer-specialists requires solving a dilemma inherent to reserve manpower: the most specialized and talented military government specialists are also typically those who have some of the most challenging civilian professional obligations. As discussed above, establishing the military government deep expertise as a branch immaterial position with additional skill identifiers will lessen the professional burden on these already well-encumbered officers. Because officers typically join the CA Corps as mid-grade captains or junior majors, often transitioning from active duty, the military transitioning typically coincides with significant civilian transition, putting the officer at greater risk of attrition from the military.

Educational Incentives

In addition to removing superfluous training requirements for branch immaterial military government specialists, the CA proponent can fund desirable professional education courses that would appeal to professional specialists and serve as incentives for retention. In 2012, USACAPOC(A), in partnership with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), piloted the Security, Stability, and Development in Complex Operations (SSDCO) graduate certificate program, aimed towards CA professionals.²⁹ In addition to an accredited graduate certificate, the program was authorized as granting equivalency for the Advanced Operations Course, required for Army officers to obtain senior promotions beyond the rank of lieutenant colonel.

The program was originally envisioned as a graduate degree program at NPS when it was inaugurated in 2012.³⁰ Originally, students were envisioned to complete SSDCO, along with two other modules, in addition to completing a graduate research project. This would have allowed NPS to confer a master's degree to the mid-level CA professional, an incredibly valuable incentive. Unfortunately, the course ceased in 2017 due to funding constraints and other issues. It has nonetheless been hailed as an incredibly popular and useful recruiting tool—in addition to being a practically useful educational program.

Financial Incentives

Along with such professional education incentives, officers should be financially incentivized for maintaining critical skills. 38A officers are already considered language-dependent and eligible for foreign language pay and often receive critical skills bonuses. Military government positions should be coded for regional languages, multiple if possible, and be given financial incentive for meaningful maintenance of language and technical skills.

In addition to the application of existing proficiency pay for languages, the recruitment and retention of military government specialists could be augmented by two separate financial

incentives: a one-time bonus for the award of a relevant SI and a monthly proficiency pay for officers serving in positions coded for the SI.

A one-time signing bonus for the award of a relevant military government SI should be available to all RC officers, no matter the unit of assignment or branch. This would incentivize those officers to self-nominate for the SIs and give the USAR the ability to identify as many officers as possible within the available force pool with specialized civilian skill sets. While the exact amount of the bonus should be fixed by personnel and finance specialists, the bonus need not be exorbitant, but simply enough to attract RC officers to self-nominate. This would, in turn, significantly assist with recruitment requirements as officers would be easily searchable through existing personnel databases.

Secondly, officers who hold the relevant SIs should be given a monthly proficiency pay as long as they are serving in positions coded for the SI. Just as the current 38G SIs stratify the specialties by level of mastery, the level of incentive pay should be based on the degree of mastery in the particular SI. As with the one-time bonus, the amount of the proficiency pay need not be exorbitant, but should be enough to attract high-level practitioners to consider reassignment within the CA Corps for at least a broadening assignment within a functional specialty team.

Conclusion

A successful support of peer and near-peer strategic priorities requires the CA Corps to reclaim itself as a strategic asset and a force for winning without fighting across the entire competition and not just post-conflict. In addition to SOF and conventional CA generalists, the CA Corps must be able to provide customizable 38G specialty teams, leveraged from a reasonably identifiable force pool, and highly specialized personnel within the RC. Strategic capability requires broad breadth and depth of experience in order to fulfill the supported GCC requirements. The transition from 38G to branch immaterial positions will add the breadth of readily available experience already contained within the reserve force pool. The basic structures needed to do so currently exist or have been recently piloted. All that is required is an appetite for change and the same characteristics and desire for innovation that preceded the creation of this storied national strategic capability, more relevant to integrated deterrence in an era of strategic competition and irregular warfare, than it was to begin with.

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²³ Jeffrey A. Jacobs (Major General, USA, retired; commander of USACAPOC(A), 2011-14), in a phone discussion with the author, March 2022.

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4E - Environment and Natural Resources

4F - Energy

4G - Judiciary and Legal System

4H - Corrections

6E - Commerce and Trade

6F - Transportation 6G - Water and Sanitation

6R - Technology and Telecommunications

6U - Agribusiness and Food

6W – Archivist”

Department of the Army, *FY22 Military Government Specialist (38G) Panel Announcement (Army Reserves)*, MILPER 21-368 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021).

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Civil Affairs Operations in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Major Tony Smith

Introduction

Civil affairs (CA) can serve as a force for winning without fighting by adopting counter-artificial intelligence (AI) strategies that reduce geopolitical competitors' means to resist and enable the joint force to secure advantages in both the information and human dimensions. Sun Tzu, an advocate for winning without fighting, provides two tenets relevant to CA and AI. First, attacking an enemy's strategy is far better than engaging in armed conflict.¹ CA, a force that operates in the psycho-cultural sphere, is one of the Army's unique capabilities suited to counter-AI strategies in the civil environment. It is in the civil environment where the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia look to leverage AI in order to gain an advantage in competition. Second, to win without fighting requires breaking an enemy's resistance.² The PRC and Russia intend to challenge the United States through AI-driven asymmetric warfare (ADAW) and intelligence-driven warfare; both focused on winning in the information and human dimensions. Counter-AI strategies that reduce geopolitical competitors' ability to execute these concepts degrade their means to resist and their ability to succeed in competition. CA can develop counter-AI strategies for competition by examining AI's role in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Lessons drawn from the Russo-Ukrainian war reveal that future civil affairs operations (CAO) must incorporate tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to detect, protect, and defend against threats associated with malicious AI. Detection measures include understanding an operating area's digital and data landscape and subsequently identifying AI technologies operating in the civil environment, particularly in the information domain. Protective measures involve reducing risk to CA forces and the civil networks constructed within the civil environment. Finally, defensive measures include activities that increase resiliency in the civil environment and challenge geopolitical competitors' attempts to delegitimize military operations, destabilize society through disinformation, and create instability in governmental institutions.

The AI Race: PRC and Russian Strategy

Over the last decade, geopolitical competitors have engaged in an AI arms race in an effort to alter the international rules-based order. In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted the significance of AI by claiming, "Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world."³ Since then, Russia has focused militarily on ADAW capabilities that challenge the United States in the information domain.⁴ Russia's conquest for advanced AI "has the potential to hyperpower Russia's use of disinformation—the intentional spread of false and misleading information for the purpose of influencing politics and societies."⁵

In the same year as Putin's address, the People's Republic of China (PRC) rolled out a comprehensive strategy to achieve AI dominance across all areas of national power with three major milestones. These three milestones include matching world leaders in AI development and deployment, leading the AI race, and dominating in AI by 2030.⁶ National security experts believe that the PRC has met its first goal.⁷ Three key figures support these claims. First, the PRC leads the world in the number of AI-published research papers.⁸ More importantly, PRC is on target to produce the largest share of the top 10% most cited papers in the field within the next couple of years.⁹ Second, the PRC maintains a dominating lead in the total number of AI patents filed, controlling 65% of the global share.¹⁰ Finally, with a much smaller budget, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has likely matched the Pentagon's investments in military AI programs.¹¹

The 2022 National Security Strategy identifies the PRC as the United States' long-term pacing challenge and states that the "PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it."¹² In AI, the PRC has crafted a robust AI strategy supported by an umbrella of complementary state strategies. These include the PRC's: Thousand Talents Program, Made in China 2025, China Standards 2035, Civil-Military Fusion, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).¹³ Militarily, the PRC has adopted the concept of intelligence-drive warfare, which foundationally relies on AI to win without fighting by waging a cognitive war. This concept focuses on using AI to influence key decision-makers and flood the information domain with disinformation designed to manipulate civil society.¹⁴

These nested strategies adopted by the PRC are real problems for future CAO. The primary purpose of CA is to "engage and leverage the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or providing governance."¹⁵ CA accomplishes this task through CAO, allowing it to secure advantages in the information and human dimensions for the Army's operating concept writ large.¹⁶ Geopolitical competitor use of malicious AI directed at the civil environment challenges CA forces in fulfilling their mission in support of military objectives. For example, Russia's use of ADAW and the PRC's application of intelligentized warfare both attempt to manipulate the civil environment and contest the space where CA forces operate.

Mapping the Complexity of Civil Affairs Operations

"The sooner I can get rid of these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters."¹⁷

General Dwight Eisenhower, *Operation Torch*

In 2021, the CA branch adopted four core competencies formed around its traditional role of supporting or establishing governance: 1) transitional governance (TG), 2) civil network development and engagement (CNDE), 3) civil knowledge integration (CKI), and 4) civil-military integration (CMI).¹⁸ Each competency provides capabilities nested under CAO that support

enhancing, enabling, and providing governance across the competition continuum. The use of malicious AI in the Russo-Ukrainian war illustrates how geopolitical competitors will contest each competency in the future. Ultimately, the challenges imposed by malicious AI degrade the effectiveness and increase the complexity of future CAO across the competition continuum. Though the challenges introduced in this section come from mostly armed conflict examples, PRC's and Russia's AI strategies demonstrate their intent to extend these activities across the competition spectrum.

First, malicious AI designed to degrade the effectiveness of TG increases the complexity of CAO. TG includes "actions taken to assure appropriate control and continuity of government functions throughout the range of military operations."¹⁹ AI-powered disinformation campaigns targeting civil society can delegitimize military operations and government institutions that CA supports. For example, in 2022, Russia released a video on social media of President Zelensky instructing Ukrainian citizens to surrender to Russian forces, causing mass confusion amongst the Ukrainian population, including its armed forces engaged with Russian troops at the time.²⁰ This ADAW attack, using deepfake machine learning technology, appeared realistic enough that President Zelensky was forced to go on record to deny its authenticity.²¹ Its application demonstrates how this technology can impact the legitimacy of governmental institutions, civil leaders, and the effectiveness of military operations.

AI-powered cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure during TG increases the complexity of CAO. Cyber defense analysts have outlined Russia's appetite to leverage AI to influence and manipulate population perception, sow distrust and chaos into society, delegitimize governmental institutions, attack critical infrastructure, and disrupt political and social arenas.²² Russia's cyberattack on Ukraine's power grid in 2015 illustrates the destructive potential this type of attack has on critical infrastructure,²³ crucial to the delivery of essential governmental services. Cyberattacks powered by AI create the potential for greater access and manipulation of critical infrastructure.²⁴ This method of attack is not unique to Russia, as PLA researchers have actively studied the Ukrainian power grid incident.²⁵ Coupled with Chinese investments in AI, PLA's ability to replicate such an attack can significantly challenge the ability of CA forces to conduct TG in a contested environment in the event critical infrastructure becomes disrupted.

Historic lessons illustrate how degraded critical infrastructure combined with poorly staged CA forces can delay and tax military operations during TG. During the Allies' WWII Sicilian campaign, electrical outages and transportation infrastructure damage exacerbated food shortages. For starters, food processing depended heavily on electricity to mill grain into flour. In addition, the distribution of processed food relied on a transportation infrastructure to transport end products across the island.²⁶ As a result of these issues, allied military logistics and transportation assets became allocated to meet civilian requirements, often competing with military priorities.²⁷ In limited quantity, CA officers became bogged down in areas desperate for civil administration, making them unavailable to advance with forces on the front line as city after city became

liberated.²⁸ As a result, tactical units found themselves without CA support, an issue that frustrated General George Patton during the early portion of the Sicily campaign.²⁹ Modern-day combat, powered by AI, potentially compounds Patton's frustration by exhausting the capabilities of CA forces to address significant critical infrastructure losses, forcing civil administration problems on tactical units engaged in combat.

Geopolitical competitors' use of malicious AI to collect publicly available data for reconnaissance and targeting increases the complexity of Civil Affairs' second core competency, CNDE. CNDE are activities "by which the civil network capabilities and resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and integrated into operations."³⁰ In short, civil networks are the entities or groups that interact with each other within the civil environment.³¹ CA forces develop civil networks to understand the operating environment and support military operations.³² Geopolitical competitors executing reconnaissance powered by AI seek to challenge the development of these networks by identifying vulnerable nodes in the network. For example, utilizing machine learning and web scraping, social network analysis allows geopolitical competitors to use public data to map relationships across social media networks.³³ This approach is similar to counterterrorism methods utilized to map terrorist nodes and networks.³⁴ Ultimately CNDE becomes challenged when geopolitical competitors successfully identify vulnerabilities to exploit and degrade the civil network constructed by CA forces to support CAO.

In 2022, Ukraine demonstrated a low-cost AI reconnaissance capability that identified deceased or captured Russian soldiers using Clearview AI, a web-based facial recognition software.³⁵ Clearview AI data mines social media photos and provides users access to instant identification using an AI algorithm.³⁶ Ukraine allegedly used this information to contact family members of deceased or captured Russian soldiers.³⁷ In some cases, Ukraine sent photos of the service member for psychological effect.³⁸ Geopolitical competitors can potentially leverage similar methods to identify and intimidate components of the civil network in order to dissuade them from working with the United States, much like the infamous night letters in Afghanistan. In this example, geopolitical competitors could target those stakeholders supporting U.S. military action through blackmail and intimidation to coerce them into withdrawing support. AI that targets in this manner across CNDE adds complexity to CAO by challenging the ability of CA forces to build relationships and protect their partners.

Geopolitical competitors' malicious use of AI adds complexity to CA's final two core competencies: CKI and CMI. CKI includes "actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil information for operational relevance and informing the warfighting function."³⁹ CMI involves consolidating gains, creating cooperation, and synchronizing capabilities to achieve unified action.⁴⁰ Competitors can counter CKI and CMI by using disinformation methods powered by AI. Disinformation techniques countering CKI and CMI focus on undermining data collection to distort a CA force's understanding of the environment and challenge synchronization efforts by creating friction between stakeholders.

Russia's use of AI on social media illustrates how a geopolitical competitor can employ disinformation tactics to counter CKI and CMI. Using openly available AI technology, Russia launched a series of AI-powered deepfakes and social media disinformation campaigns against Ukraine. These incidents demonstrated Russia's ability to leverage machine learning and natural language processing techniques capable of producing thousands of messages to disinform audiences and distort the information environment.⁴¹ Supporting geopolitical competitor disinformation campaigns are programs such as GPT-3, which demonstrates AI's ability to produce and adjust computer-generated messages based on human-to-machine interaction in an effort to shape group perception to a desired state.⁴²

While disinformation in war is nothing new, Russia has broken ground by being one of the first to deploy AI-powered disinformation as a tactic in a conventional armed conflict.⁴³ CKI systems that pull this data for analysis and evaluation become contaminated with inaccurate information, thus impacting the ability to gain a comprehensive understanding of the environment through CKI activities. Furthermore, disinformation tactics can influence stakeholders in the CMI arena and affect their willingness or decision-making cycle to support friendly operations. Russia traditionally uses this tactic across social media and news outlets to cause friction between groups, otherwise known as divide and rule.⁴⁴ Using Russia's divide-and-rule tactic, disinformation designed to create mistrust may affect synergy between military and civilian stakeholders and prevent the unified action required for CMI, thus reducing the effectiveness of CAO.

Historically, failure to achieve unity of effort based on a poor understanding of the operating environment has proven costly to military operations. Operation Anaconda in 2002 demonstrated how failure to understand the adversary and synchronize relevant stakeholders culminated in a near-failed operation.⁴⁵ Anaconda's hammer and anvil concept required the eastern alliance, indigenous to Afghanistan, to complement the actions of Task Force Rakkasans. Instead, U.S. forces were left without a critical partner when the Eastern Alliance failed to support the operation as planned.⁴⁶ This lesson provides a glimpse into the risks associated with AI employed by a technologically advanced geopolitical competitor attempting to degrade or prevent unified action. From a CA perspective, AI-powered disinformation can impose high costs on military operations by distorting CKI output and altering key stakeholders' decision-making and willingness to contribute to unified action during CMI.

The AI-imposed challenges to CA core competencies require the branch to adopt new TTPs that counter geopolitical competitors' AI strategies. Three main trends from the Russo-Ukrainian war require the CA branch to address an adversary's use of AI across the competition spectrum. First, geopolitical competitors will use AI to deny the U.S. control of the information domain through ADAW designed to influence local, regional, and global perception. Second, malicious AI will predominantly target the civil environment and stakeholders crucial to the CA mission. Examples range from targeting government officials with disinformation campaigns, attacking critical infrastructure, and exploiting vulnerable populations. Lastly, authoritarian surveillance-based AI

technology and AI-powered disinformation will disrupt unified action and influence the decision-making cycle of key leaders and civil society. Geopolitical competitors will likely use divide-and-rule tactics powered by AI to challenge a CA force's ability to synchronize and converge capabilities in the civil environment using CAO.

Recommendations

Detection Measures

Detection measures begin with a comprehensive understanding of the digital and data landscape. The CA Corps must embrace the cyber domain's interrelationship with the civil environment as geopolitical competitors seek to author a digital space in their image. Digital trade agreements, internet fragmentation, national cloud storage, server locations, competing global norms regarding digital privacy, responsible data use, social media platforms, and big-tech stakeholders are elements of the operating environment CA forces must master in order to execute counter-AI strategies. First, the CA Corps should incorporate technology and data expertise into its 38G military government specialties in order to understand how these elements impact governance and the civil environment. Second, CA units must utilize tools within their CKI cells to reduce the effectiveness of disinformation and enhance the supported commanders understanding of the operating environment. Lastly, CA forces should leverage strategic as well as tactical civil reconnaissance (CR) in geographical areas of competition in order to assess the risk of an adversary's use of advanced technologies powered by AI.

The CA Corps must expand its functional specialties to build expertise in technology and data in order to support its ability to provide governance support in these areas. There are currently five CA functional areas of expertise: civil security, civil control, essential services, government support, and economic stabilization and infrastructure.⁴⁷ Subcategories of each area reveal a gap in AI and data expertise at the governance level. Since AI impacts the entirety of CA functional specialties, omitting this specialty creates a lack of ownership toward building expertise in AI. As a result, the CA Corps must invest in building capacity in its people and organizations to adapt to technological advancements impacting governance. Adding a technology and data specialty becomes more crucial as governments continue to grow and depend on AI capabilities to support their economic growth. Otherwise, the lack of AI expertise in CA units puts military operations in the civil environment at risk as geopolitical competitors export technology to foreign governments and civil society.

With expertise established at the governance level, CAO requires multiple detection methods to identify the AI activities of geopolitical competitors. For starters, CA forces must begin with disinformation in the information domain, where geopolitical competitors intend to target using ADAW and intelligence-driven warfare. Disinformation not only attempts to shape public opinion but also serves as a tool that geopolitical competitors can wield to impact opposing competitors' understanding of an operating environment through the age-old tactic of deception. One immediate

defense against deception is integrating Human in the Loop Artificial Intelligence (HAI) to detect deceptive information designed to degrade the CKI process. HAI relies "on human intelligence to perform very complex tasks— for example, natural language understanding—or to incorporate fairness and/or explainable properties into the system."⁴⁸ CKI analysts can vet algorithmic collected data and confirm flagged information containing potential disinformation. Serving as fact-checkers, operators can analyze collected information before including it in data supporting civil preparation of the battlefield. CKI cells should adopt HAI to detect and alert analysts of a geopolitical competitors' use of AI-powered disinformation targeting CKI. Outside of HAI, some fully automated AI programs already show promise in identifying and classifying disinformation and should be considered for CKI operations.⁴⁹

Strategic and tactical CR is another activity CA forces can leverage to support detection measures. The CR mission set involves "targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil factors in the operating environment."⁵⁰ Crucial to AI detection is identifying imported technology within an operating area in order to assess the potential risk to the mission. For example, in coordination with telecommunication companies such as Huawei, Chinese AI technology firms continue to expand digital infrastructure under the BRI umbrella to neighboring countries such as Myanmar.⁵¹ Technology exported from China to BRI participating countries expands China's invasive data collection infrastructure, allowing China to leverage this information and exploit it through AI systems operating in these satellite areas.⁵² CR missions must detect imported technology within an operating area to aid detection efforts and mitigate the effectiveness of their use.

Protective Measures

Starting with doctrine, CAO should adopt and integrate protective measures to counter malicious AI threatening CA and friendly civil networks supporting military operations. Protective measures focus on the CA force and its direct civil network within an operating environment. First, CA forces should integrate technological mechanisms into military operations that reduce AI's success rate. Second, CA forces should employ physical measures to counter the effectiveness of AI algorithms. Lastly, CA forces should reduce their digital footprint to decrease data collection conducted by hostile AI systems.

CA forces should incorporate technological solutions to counter the effectiveness of geopolitical competitors' AI systems. One such example, LOWKEY, is a software program that alters photographs to prevent facial recognition algorithms from establishing connections using commercial databases housing social media photographs.⁵³ Photos modified by LOWKEY avoid Amazon and Microsoft facial recognition software with a success rate of 99%.⁵⁴ LOWKEY programmers claim "that social media users are no longer confronted with a choice between withdrawing their social media presence from public view and risking the repercussions of being surveilled."⁵⁵ Programs such as LOWKEY can sanitize photographic information for operational

security considerations or serve as a tool to promote privacy across civil society. LOWKEY and similar programs can assist in avoiding exploitation vulnerabilities, such as the Ukrainian's use of Clearview AI, which allowed them to identify Russian troops and pursue psychological effects against family members.⁵⁶

Physical barriers and masking the environment are other solutions CA forces should adopt to protect their operations. These measures physically block AI software from collecting information for analysis. Privacy experts offer practical solutions, including special clothing and physical masks, that reduce the effectiveness of facial recognition software and prevent identity detection.⁵⁷ While still novel and far from foolproof, this type of protection demonstrates areas for consideration for protecting vulnerable populations within CA's civil networks. For example, in Hong Kong, protesters used special facial devices to avoid detection by AI surveillance technology employed by the PRC.⁵⁸ In addition, masking the environment offers unique solutions for autonomous AI systems, such as China's autonomous robotics used in Shanghai to enforce its COVID lockdown.⁵⁹ For instance, one study suggests that masking objects in the physical environment could manipulate these autonomous systems and degrade their effectiveness.⁶⁰

CA forces should incorporate protective measures to reduce their digital footprint in order to protect CAO and civil networks. AI has hyper-powered novice smartphone and data-tracking methods creating greater insights into society's movements.⁶¹ Civil Affairs teams, traditionally dependent on commercial and nonsecure communication in certain environments, become vulnerable to this type of tracking. Given this, civil network engagement is susceptible to adversary tracking and analysis through AI-powered systems. As a protective measure, CA operators, and those working with these forces, should review privacy settings on their devices and establish best practices to reduce their vulnerability.

Defensive Measures

CAO require defensive countermeasures to neutralize offensive AI activities designed to delegitimize military operations and governmental institutions. Defensive measures focus on malicious AI in the civil environment, not necessarily CA forces or their networks directly. Drawing from logic in the NDS,⁶² creating a resilient civil society serves to deter geopolitical competitors by reducing the effectiveness of their ADAW and intelligence-driven warfare capabilities. First, CA forces can integrate media literacy campaigns aimed at vulnerable civilian populations and civil society groups. Second, CA forces can leverage influential actors within social media. Third, CA forces can promote AI fact-check resources to counter disinformation campaigns. Finally, CA forces should globally engage foreign governmental institutions and private corporations to support the DoD's Responsible Artificial Intelligence (RAI) Strategy tenet of building a RAI ecosystem.

Media literacy campaigns provide the first direct defense against AI disinformation operations. Media literacy involves creating awareness and skills in civil society to better "analyze, evaluate,

create, and act using all forms of communication."⁶³ Taiwan, receiving the largest share of PRC disinformation, shows how media literacy can successfully serve as a defensive measure against disinformation powered by AI.⁶⁴ Incorporating media literacy into CAO provides a practical approach that counters the effectiveness of ADAW and intelligence-driven warfare by enhancing civil society's resilience against disinformation.

Key opinion leaders (KOL) and social media influencers (SMI) are additional resources CA forces can leverage to decrease the effectiveness of disinformation. In both Russia and Ukraine, KOLs and SMIs have served as conduits for information and have contributed to the spread and containment of disinformation.^{65 66 67} CAO that incorporates these resources can extend a CA unit's reach to a larger audience compared to competitors relying on AI-generated accounts. Influencers and social media actors could also be powerful resources to promote media literacy and highlight a geopolitical competitor's use of disinformation. The White House has undertaken similar activities with Ukrainian influencers directly,⁶⁸ which DoD can arguably execute across its combatant commands at the operational-strategic level.

Fact-check bots are another effective way CA forces can challenge disinformation attacks by geopolitical competitors. Fact-check bots are tools that a user can apply to assess the reliability of a source through natural language processing and machine learning. For example, the Ukrainian government promoted fact-check bots in its war against Russia in 2022 to counter Russian disinformation.⁶⁹ Similarly, the Taiwanese government and its private sector have integrated fact-check bots powered by AI to counter PRC disinformation.⁷⁰ CA should promote these tools to reduce the effectiveness of competitors' attempts to offensively deploy disinformation through AI across societies that lack these resources.

The final defensive measure involves integrating CAO into the DoD's RAI Strategy. CA forces should support the RAI ecosystem tenet, which "promotes a shared understanding of responsible AI design, development, deployment, and use through domestic and international engagement."⁷¹ Forward persistent presence and mission sets make CA a valuable resource the DoD can leverage in order to promote democratic norms and values crucial to AI technology and its adoption abroad. Promoting RAI with foreign governments challenges the expanding footprint of geopolitical competitors attempting to export technology and govern the use of AI using authoritarian values.

Conclusion

As the Civil Affairs Corps explores ways to win without fighting in competition powered by AI, it must consider detective, protective, and defensive measures that reduce the threat to CAO. Geopolitical competitors' use of malicious AI increases the complexity and decreases the effectiveness of CAO. CA forces assume significant risk operating in the future environment without the recommended measures. Previous proposals from CA professionals primarily focus on the expected gains associated with adopting AI technology while ignoring a reactive enemy making investments in the same systems.^{72 73} CA professionals' calls to integrate AI-type software

into CAO has merit. However, the enemy's use of the same technology must be of equal concern. The use of advanced technologies comes with inherent risks and limitations, especially as the CA Corps moves to integrate these tools. Geopolitical competitors get a vote on their effectiveness. Future AI programs incorporated into CAO must account for geopolitical competitors' application of AI technology. Geopolitical competitors are actively employing measures that make introducing such systems complex. Russia and the PRC's persistent investments in rapidly evolving AI technologies will magnify this challenge in the future as both continue a policy to contest the United States regionally and globally, particularly in the civil information environment.

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Refining the Civil Affairs Value Proposition: Governance in the Modern Operational Environment

Captain John Wirges

Introduction

In 1991, former President George H.W. Bush stated that “the ghosts of Vietnam had been laid to rest beneath the sands of the Arabian desert.”¹ *Operation Desert Storm* showcased the United States Military’s adept skill in conducting large scale combat operations and, over the last thirty years—whether through Air-Land Battle, Unified Land Operations, or Multi-Domain Operations—the joint force has proven an unquestionable ability to layer fire and maneuver for operational effects. While limited irregular warfare operations in the 1990s, such as *Operation Provide Comfort*, proved successful in achieving strategic end states, twenty years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan showed both successes and failures at all levels of operation.²

Today, as a chaotic world continues to evolve into a multi-polar struggle amongst competing powers, non-state actors, and a growing informational environment, the ghosts of Vietnam are not laid to rest. The lessons we can learn from the past manifest in every area of the world, as U.S. forces work by, with, and through indigenous partners to compete and collaborate with a variety of actors. In this world, the role of civil affairs (CA) forces can provide outsized effect if properly organized, understood, and operationalized by Service Component Commands, Theater Special Operations Commands, and Task Forces in all areas of the globe. As CA units seek to understand, illuminate, and leverage civil networks in support of campaign plans and whole of government efforts to compete and win without fighting, CA doctrine, organization, and education must continue to evolve to build institutional knowledge and articulate how to define governance in support of not only transitional but steady state, preventative military operations.

The U.S. foreign policy apparatus is facing a chaotic and multi-faceted operating environment. The 2022 *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) identifies the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and transboundary threats as primary challenges. The NDS also suggests that U.S. success in this multi-polar world requires a whole of government approach, campaigning across all elements of national power.³ The U.S. Government’s ability to compete and win against foreign adversaries without resorting to major armed conflict requires unique and synchronized capabilities to gain strategic understanding, provide overmatch, and deter aggression when necessary. One such capability is civil affairs.

In recognizing the changing operational environment, CA has gone back to its origins in vocalizing its value proposition to the Joint Force: governance. Doctrinal updates in the 2021 Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, codified core competencies such as Transitional Governance and its two missions: Transitional Military Authority (TMA) and Support to Civil Administration (SCA).⁴ How core competencies such as “transitional governance,” however, can be articulated and operationalized in support of integrated deterrence to win without fighting remains nebulous.

This paper seeks to articulate how CA supports the development of resiliencies and resistance in civil society through political systems in greater context than “governance,” and recommends the development of loan programs, government function training courses, and continued integration with other special operations capabilities.

Doctrine, Training, and Education

Ambiguous definitions of governance and government, and reliance upon stability doctrine, are current roadblocks to the CA Corps’ ownership of governance related tasks. FM 3-57 defines governance as the “state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society.”⁵ This definition is nested with Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, and taken from JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, published in 2018. This definition, narrow in scope, infers that governance is reliant upon the activities of a formal nation-state, which is inconsistent with the notion that irregular warfare is a struggle between state and non-state actors for influence over civilian populations.⁶ Training Circular (TC) 18-01.01, *Unconventional Warfare Mission Planning Guide for the Special Forces Operational Detachment–Alpha Level*, states that “governance creates, resources, manages, and sustains the institutions and processes through which a society is governed, is protected, and prospers.”⁷ This is a far more appropriate definition to build a core competency for CA. Broadening the definition of governance makes clearer that governance activities—separate from government functions—involve the illumination of networks which manage influence and relative power in a society. This supports a more articulated conduct of irregular warfare, which fundamentally supports allies and friendly networks, building preventative resiliencies in society which deter adversary aggression and win prior to fighting.

This paper proposes a refined definition which may be utilized to better understand governance in training and educating CA Soldiers: *Governance is a society’s systems and processes of organization which political power is exercised, resources are allocated, and behavior is influenced. These political, economic, social, and security systems may be formal or informal.*

Civil Affairs Teams (CATs), with an emphasis on those CATs deployed under Civil Military Engagement (CME) authorities, provide a supported commander and Country team a more comprehensive understanding of civil terrain.⁸ The newly published FM 3-0, *Operations*, states that knowledge about the operational environment, requiring persistent and aggressive information collection, is paramount to effective action.⁹ CA operations (CAO) oriented on the illumination of core values, formal and informal political systems, and resource control provides this requisite knowledge as a low-cost tool for persistent engagement. USSOCOM Directive 525-38, codifying the CME program, also makes clear that CME is the CA contribution to preparation of the environment activities, directly supporting theater campaign and contingency plans and country strategies.¹⁰ CA units execute these functions primarily within the core competency of civil network development and engagement (CNDE).¹¹

Through civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and civil network development, CATs map and engage relevant civil networks, identifying physical and human infrastructure, potential cadres, and support the hardening of local resiliencies. These networks and individual nodes, when viewed through the joint force's view of PMESII variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure), influence the allocation of resources and control over society.¹² While this explanation does not disregard the Army's concept of PMESII-PT¹³ as operational variables, it recognizes the additional value that Joint Doctrine's view of PMESII systems have in understanding the civil environment and relationship between political and informational systems—notably the cognitive domain of the informational environment—on the development of resiliencies, support to civil resistance, and out competing with an adversary without resorting to major conflict. Additionally, a reliance on a systems perspective of PMESII helps synchronize CAO across all branches, as the grounding in Joint Doctrine can apply to both Army and Marine Corps CA formations.

The Joint Force's understanding of the operational environment views PMESII variables as interdependent systems and subsystems in an environment which ultimately generate influence and power. These systems—notably political, economic, and social systems—are the core of national power and upon which CAO should orient during all phases of conflict. A 2006 edition of the *Political Military Analysis Handbook*, published by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), provides in depth overview of PMESII systems, including formal and informal government structures which CA soldiers are designed to map and influence. As the 2022 CA Roundtable makes clear, along with a growing literature, influencing these systems manifests in the way military forces can build advantage through cognitive warfare, which first requires an understanding of society and the mechanisms in which society can voice and address grievances.¹⁴ The handbook also references scholars, such as David Easton and Gabriel Almond, who pioneered the systems approach to governments. Gabriel Almond stated in 1965 that the observation of anthropological and social systems provides an understanding of how power is derived, legitimated, and maintained in a living political system.¹⁵ As training courses and doctrine evolve, formal Political Military analysis through a PMESII systems approach provides CA professionals the tools necessary to understand and deliberately engage in complex socio-political environments. In *Into the Gray Zone: Integration of Civil Affairs and Information Operations with Embassies*, the authors showcase how these activities can enable Marine CA forces to support anti-access and anti-denial activities in the event of conflict.¹⁶ Through understanding and influencing those systems, CA forces can provide an understanding of resource allocation, economic control, and key mobilizers in society through governance.

The CA competency of CNDE illuminates a society's systems and processes of organization by which political power is exercised, resources are allocated, and behavior is influenced. These political, economic, social, and security systems may be formal or informal, existing inside or outside of formal governmental structures. The central argument of this paper contends that if

properly understood, “support to governance” exists through the fundamental conduct of CAO and can be articulated through the mapping of PMESII systems more adeptly than through merely the term “transitional governance.” The concept of governance being “transitional” applies to the TMA exercised by CA forces and appropriate military governments during consolidation of large-scale combat operations, but the collaboration, support to civil administration, and network development conducted to map and influence society to prevent conflict is in no way “transitional.”¹⁷ CA forces serve as a primary link between military commanders and interagency partners in facilitating a whole of government approach to complex problems, underscoring their role in supporting military and interagency partners in the execution of governance activities. In Africa, where a central government in and of itself may be a driver of continued conflict, collaboration with the nation state may require the illumination and influence of sub-national PMESII systems, identifying core values and relationships at the local that may be in competition with national political or economic systems. In this level manner CAO may support governance not through the application of government functions but through civil reconnaissance and information collection. This example, however, showcases how, when properly implemented, collected and analyzed civil information can support U.S. initiatives to engage at multiple levels of local society to create indigenous cognitive and political resiliencies necessary to deter adversary aggression.¹⁸

The development of sub-national and regional PMESII systems sets the foundation for layering these preventative effects to harden cognitive resiliencies, create overmatch, and deter adversary action through active support to Campaign Plans and Contingency Plans (CONPLANS). Should crisis arise, mapped human and physical infrastructure can provide limited governance support through engagement with social networks and resource allocation which provides options to commanders to deter further aggression. These operations additionally influence the cognitive domain through targeted effects and provide necessary and detailed information to commanders to understand the operational environment through the context of PMESII governance systems. In a 2006 manuscript, MAJ Kris Arnold stated that “Though non-state actors typically do not possess infrastructure similar to that of a state, they may in fact possess loose political connections, clandestine funding sources, interspersed population support, informal media outlets, and small direct action cells, all of which loosely fit in the PMESII typology...in other words, their critical capabilities and requirements.”¹⁹ This activity supports the administration of these areas through indigenous organizations, filling the role of transitional governance. Ultimately, targeted civil reconnaissance, network development, and system engagement set conditions for attaining the strategic end state to military conflict.

Governance also manifests in the study of resistance and resilience in civil society. These arguments also draw from historical precedent in CA doctrine. FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, from October 1969 discusses military civic action as a “means of internal defense, rather than simply as the provision of amenities to civilians.”²⁰ The Resistance Operations Concept (ROC), published out of U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (USSOCEUR),

highlights the development of resiliencies through a whole-of-society defense system. The common CA input to these processes is the identification of essential service sectors and systems of control, as well as the influence of those groups to build resiliencies. This civil defense concept, known in Europe and to NATO civil military cooperation (CIMIC) Partners, sets the conditions for resistance through community organization, training, and resiliency development—all which nest with a proposed definition of governance. The ROC states “training and education can prepare individuals and larger groups for resistance activities and strengthen the population’s will to resist an aggressor.”²¹ Examples of this may include Reserve CA units conducting disaster response training with local level law enforcement, building resiliencies in societies while also mapping supporting PMESII systems. The development of resiliencies—both cognitive, physical, and network redundancies—which support a society in resistance supports the deterrence and overmatch critical to winning without fighting.

While the CA Corps should recognize that governance is not merely post conflict nor directly related to government functions, military government functions may benefit temporal understanding of PMESII systems. Military government, manifesting in current doctrine as TMA, can also draw from the U.S. experience in WWII and Vietnam. Mobile Military Government Teams—a capability which may exist in a modern CAT—fought alongside combat units and were tasked with establishing order through government structures as allied forces moved through Italy and France in WWII.²² As the joint force orients on multipolar competition across the entire continuum, CA forces are uniquely postured to enhance understanding and a total civil defense construct, facilitating the organization of society through friendly governments to compete and display tangible overmatch against our adversaries.

This undertaking is the pinnacle of governance activities, and something Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Samuel Vaughan Wilson²³ identified while establishing the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program in the Vietnam War.²⁴ The inclusion of vignettes such as the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) program in WWII and CORDS program during the Vietnam War, highlighting both total civil defense in resistance as well as network development in support of military governance, serve to enhance institutional knowledge of governance across the competition continuum.

The CORDS program is widely considered one of the few successful strategies in the Vietnam Conflict. CORDS was the primary mission set for CA forces throughout Vietnam, focusing on a population centric approach to law enforcement development—which fed into the more controversial Phoenix Program—as well as governance development, economic development, and assistance activities. Notably, the CORDS program was a whole of government approach which ultimately reported to Ambassador Robert Komer, civilian deputy to Gen. Westmoreland on the staff of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. CORDS agencies included the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Army, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of State, and Department of Agriculture. Notably, CORDS directed all interagency officials inside of a geographic area under one unified military commander, which created unity

of command in each district and region: this was key to CORDS success.²⁵ CORDS allowed CA elements to work with interagency counterparts and local Vietnamese society to strengthen local resiliencies through indigenous institutions, increased perception of legitimate local government through little technical government expertise, and eroded support for Viet Cong insurgents.²⁶ This vignette can serve as a model for a whole of government approach to regional issues the NDS indicates is a priority. These vignettes also serve to showcase how properly executed CA governance-oriented network development can support an integrated, civil military operations mission command infrastructure to gain strategic understanding and apply whole of government capabilities, deterring adversary aggression and preventing conflict.

As the CA proponent continues revision of Army Training Publication (ATP) 3-57.80, *Civil Affairs in Special Operations*, the role of CA in clandestine network development must be addressed in relation to how specified tactics are utilized to build networks directly impacting transitional governance tasks, notably in hostile or denied areas. Doctrinal updates which codify the role that CA Special Operations Forces (SOF) play in the use of surrogates and proxies to map networks and engage PMESII systems in denied areas will help systemize the role CAO plays in SOF network development. These tactics are similarly highlighted as adversarial tactics to compete with the U.S.²⁷ Furthermore, these programs directly enable the illumination and engagement of individuals and systems in society which support ongoing irregular warfare objectives, preparation of the environment, and operational flexible response options.²⁸

Of note is CA support to the development of government capabilities that provide resistance operations to policymakers. Additionally, bilateral network development supports layered cognitive warfare necessary to win without fighting. This bias for understanding enables a Special Operations Task Force, on order, to understand impact of effects in an irregular warfare campaign and supports the establishment of shadow government structures and undergrounds / auxiliaries in an unconventional warfare campaign. CA forces link network development to transitional governance in a SOF environment. In the event of a major conflict, this also serves to illuminate networks ahead of a forward line of troops, enabling military government and consolidation of gains directly following the seizure of terrain in the decisive phase.

While doctrinal updates—and the corresponding critical tasks—are central to CA Corps long-term growth, education opportunities are also critical to institutional knowledge in the force to support special warfare campaigns that prevent military conflict. The October 1969 version of FM 41-10 devotes chapter 12 to Military Government. This doctrine stated “military government depends on skills and training not customarily expected to be part of the attributes of military officers.”²⁹ The WWII-era School of Military Government, co-located with the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, VA highlights the importance of building relationships between academic institutions and the CA Corps. Enhanced coordination between CA units and academia are mutually beneficial options to enhance academic understanding of government administration and philosophies underpinning governance in modern society.

The foundations of the government function at the local level present the core for an advanced CA Course through 2nd Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), or 2nd SWTG (A). An advanced CA government functions course may bring in CA professionals and government function specialists such as city managers. An advanced course would cover the role of government in managing functions such as sewage, water, education, competing political ideologies and economic systems, designs of local governments, judicial processes, and the standard functions of township administrators; this course would then address how CA professionals can leverage these institutions to conduct CNDE to harden cognitive resiliencies, support strategic understanding, and increase interagency collaboration. Any course built for enhanced training should additionally enhance institutional knowledge through military government functions beneficial for a TMA situation.

These general functions enhance the role of CA in competing to win through advanced strategic understanding and collaboration with Country Teams, supporting Title 22 efforts in operations short of war to deter adversary aggression. The CA proponent, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), or U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (USACAPOC (A)) may also seek the viability of requesting through an academic institution, such National Defense University (NDU), the development of a two-week governance course which can be contracted at the unit level through either Major Force Program (MFP)-2 or MFP-11 funding streams.³⁰ These courses may be designed to facilitate utilization by CA Companies during a pre-mission training cycle or for reserve unit annual training. NDU may be the partner of choice on this endeavor, as a permanent member of the USAJFKSWCS center of excellence and government funded university. Additionally, this course aids the CA practitioner in the event of a post conflict transitional governance scenario, such as the establishment of local councils in Manbij, Syria in 2016.³¹

Organization and Policy

Long term organizational and policy considerations are equally as important to building a true value proposition in “governance.” As stated in the National Security Strategy and FM 3-0, understanding interagency roles, developing relationships, and increasing interoperability is required to compete and win without fighting. To action this, CA forces serve as a capability the DoD can leverage to build trust and unity of effort within the interagency. As the CA Corps works to build institutional knowledge on how SOF specific network development and military government functions support strategic effects and operational goals, enhanced broadening opportunities and loan programs with the interagency may be opportunities for active duty and reserve CA Soldiers and officers.

Additionally, the CA branch recently expanded key developmental assignments, indicating a manning pool which may support enhanced loan and interagency assignment opportunities. CA officers and NCOs should be provided opportunities to work with agencies including the Department of State (DoS), USAID, and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This is not a unique phenomenon: officers from other branches, including the SF branch, have opportunities

to serve interagency assignments for the professional development of the branch. Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Sam Wilson, mentioned earlier, served on loan to the U.S. Foreign Service for two years while pioneering modern counterinsurgency strategies in Vietnam in the early 1960s.³² 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) could work with the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) to develop loan programs, where CA officers could perform analysis jobs and country desks in their areas of expertise.

38G military government specialists should be provided opportunities to go on loan with areas of the federal government or Department of the Army in which they have specialty or require further development, such as with the 95th CA Brigade (SO) (A). This may provide 38G officers development in Army operations planning. SOF CA officers should be provided opportunities to go on interagency loan or broadening assignment with areas of the interagency supporting a greater understanding of network development and support to underground or auxiliary civic organizations, including DIA and DoS. These assignments provide greater awareness of the intelligence process CA forces support in diplomatic, military, and economic power projection abroad. These opportunities may not only increase interorganizational collaboration between DoD and other agencies of the Foreign Service, but also enhance the Corps' understanding of governance and government.

Another method to build trust and relationships with interagency colleagues is the use of interagency training exercises that span the spectrum of DoD to DoS led operations. Exercises between CA forces, other special operations entities, and interagency colleagues may prioritize crisis response, transitional governance, deterrence in semi-permissive environments, or complex emergency. These serve as forums to operationalize the Civil Affairs Task Force (CATF) concept and build interoperability with interagency colleagues. Existing exercises such as the 95th CA Brigade (SO) (A)'s *Operation STALKHM* may serve as platforms for such training events. These relationships are vital not only to increase the value of collaboration and loan programs, but to support whole of government deterrence operations, raising the cost of adversary actions through population-based programs to win without fighting.³³

The above issues are imperative in defining the role of CA in the modern operational environment as the Army addresses its role in preventing and preparing for conflict. Nadia Schadlow's *War and the Art of Governance* details 162 years of U.S. Army discomfort in administering political functions in occupied territories, as well as from civilian leaders in the Army conducting political actions. The *National Security Strategy* supports not just improving interagency relationships but unified action to provide options to strategic decision makers while deterring aggression. Dr. Schadlow attested that "the Army must reject the narrowly circumscribed view of the profession of arms as the 'management of violence' and reconsider its persistent hope that, in the next war, civilians will generate the capability to take over governance tasks."³⁴ If this can occur, the Army may find itself more adept in supporting allies, provide greater options to policymakers through enhanced situational understanding, and win without fighting.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Dr. Schadow makes an argument that the civilian institutions of diplomacy are not capable of operating and governing during conflict, necessitating a military government function.³⁵ The CA Corps was originally created to support governance and government; however, in refining and codifying these purposes, the branch must be specific in its value and how CA supports the Joint Force across the competition continuum. This paper recommends doctrinal refinements through standard FM revision or special texts which include greater degree of political military analysis and better define governance as the relationship of interconnected PMESII and anthropological systems. These doctrinal and educational updates should showcase how existing tools, such as civil network development, mapping of critical systems, and resource allocation are easy to implement solutions towards articulating how a governance competency supports strategic understanding, organizational collaboration, and cognitive resiliency development. Greater relationships with academia, and advanced education courses housed under USAJFKSWCS' 2nd SWTG (A) may be developed to train CA professionals across all components on systems analysis, government functions, formal and informal political system structures, and modern economic infrastructure.

Additionally, special operations should continue integrating CAO with sensitive activities and network development activities, directly impacting governance and underground/auxiliary development that supports preparation of the environment and influence operations to provide crisis response options, ensuring U.S. success short of armed conflict.

Policy and organizational progress, such as an enhanced interagency assignment or loan program may benefit both active duty and reserve soldiers, and provide increased institutional knowledge on diplomacy, development, and defense relationships. 38G assignment positions should be made available in Regular Army commands for loan officers. 1st Special Forces Command should work with the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) to support the development of loan programs across the interagency, placing CA officers and NCOs on country desks and analysis teams. Interagency training events should be prioritized to support the whole of government approach to crisis response in exercises across the competition continuum, from natural disaster to complex emergency. These events support interoperability and validate interagency mission command infrastructure under Title 10 or Title 22 supervision. These lessons, if properly built into everything from theater campaign plans to CAT critical tasks, can create cognitive and physical resiliencies which support our allies, deter conflict from ever occurring, and win without fighting.

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important, as Civil Affairs Forces in both Active Duty and Reserve formations that support conventional forces have access only to MFP-2 funding. USSOCOM funding is highly complex, reliant on MFP-2 and MFP-11 funds, as detailed in a 2014 Rand publication (Loredo et. al, *Authorities and Options for Funding USSOCOM Operations* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2014).

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Social Sciences Contribution to Civil Affairs

Captain John McLaughlin

Introduction

The Civil Affairs (CA) Corps must introduce theory and practical skillsets from the social sciences to fulfill its role as an information related capability and one prepared to “engage and leverage the civil component of the operational environment¹.” The current application of CA in the competition continuum at levels below armed conflict is not yet mature enough to navigate the complexity of human terrain: the arena of cognitive warfare. Winning without fighting involves the use of narrative identity theory and skills contained within motivational interviewing. Narrative identity theory contends that society at large has a story that reflects its belief system, understanding, and how its past and future maintain fidelity to that narrative. In addition, narrative identity lays out how experiences build, form, and contribute to self-narratives and, in turn, how the individual fits within the larger societal story.

The relevance for CA is to infuse societal narratives into the planning, preparation, and execution of the operations process. In behavioral health, the guidance is to meet a patient where they are, as opposed to where we want them, can be translated for CA to align messaging with what a culture will understand and be receptive to.² Motivational interviewing is used in psychology to enhance internal motivation to change as opposed to an authoritarian approach of demanding change. If an individual is resistant in psychology, he/she will discard any intervention. Similarly, if an individual is skeptical or hostile to CA, the Soldier is faced with an impossible task with limited guidance and sparse tools to rely on to accomplish a mission involving influence.

Influence, the business of winning without fighting, and the intricate challenge contained within the role of engage and leverage is attainable once the CA Corps trains its force on the spirit and goals of motivational interviewing. By employing narrative identity theory in area study research and applying motivational interviewing in CA mission analysis and execution, CA forces will generate reliable theories, research, and solutions to win without fighting.

Social Sciences Contribution to Civil Affairs

Civil affairs is a critical component of the Army's land force capability in the competition continuum that promotes the outcome of stability in the civil component and enables the consolidation of gains.³ FM 3-57 articulates the role and application of CA in how CA capabilities nest within the Army's strategic roles to shape operational environments (OE), prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale combat operations, and consolidate gains.⁴ Yet, within the framework of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P), there remains an opportunity to improve training. The intricacy of the competition continuum and infinitely complex human terrain create conditions in which CA Soldiers must step up to a higher level of professional competence in human-focused sciences. Through enhanced training, the CA Corps will be able to win without fighting and engage in measures that are effective outside armed conflict. The task is for CA training to apply theories from the social sciences, including narrative identity theory and motivational interviewing to execute advertised doctrinal characteristics and principles. In the spirit of winning without fighting, this will result in an end state of civil-military integration (CMI) and a competent force that can engage and leverage the civil component, enable situational understanding for the supported commander, and facilitate conflict resolution.

Winning without fighting is a concept contained within non-lethal targeting frameworks. We already understand the importance of non-lethal focus, but must broaden our lens to achieve victory before war. Our adversaries have adeptly blurred lines and learned from history that active measures and other forms of political warfare are useful tools to pursue strategic interests. However, outside problematic covert activity, there remains skillful ways to engage in proactive tasks within the competition continuum before armed conflict to arrest activities of our adversaries as they "seek to remake the international order to create a world conducive to their highly personalized and repressive type of autocracy."⁵ "Victory before war" (as an application of "Secure the Victory") should be the guiding principle of the future of CA, meaning a force guided by the spirit of influence and one endeavoring for stability in the civil component.⁶

The social sciences contain the required skills for winning without fighting. Psychological theories that are applied in individual therapeutic settings can be extended into macro settings to facilitate specific information operations (IO) mechanisms. These can prepare CA Soldiers to understand

the first dynamic of competition through the theoretical basis within narrative identity theory,⁷ While this and similar theories have historically been employed in individual behavioral health, their application and utility to all levels of war should be intuitive to credible forces that operate within human terrain. The CA Corps must have basic competence in these theories lest it simply apply “public relations gimmickry” through counterintuitive engagements and ineffective messaging.⁸ Exposing Soldiers to essential skill sets from the social sciences will support accurate engagements with the right individuals, but more importantly enable CA forces to be effective in said engagements. Desired end states will be possible due to in-depth understanding of civil terrain and societal narratives. Furthermore, engagements will be increasingly effective due to influential strategies that will ultimately inform decision making processes to support multidomain operations. The CA Corps must have social scientist warrior diplomats who will endeavor to defend the homeland, deter strategic attacks, and deter aggression.⁹ Winning without fighting does not imply a shortcut to victory, but contains the implied task of finding the correct process to accomplish a task without relying on armed conflict—in application of the principle of war of economy-of-force.

Narrative Identity Theory as Building Block for Situational Understanding

FM 3-57’s logic chart depicts the CA role within joint operations, the CA contribution to Unified Land Operations, and the application of CA capabilities across the competition continuum. Yet, current civil affairs operations (CAO) doctrine lacks adequate techniques or procedures to “engage and leverage the civil component.”¹⁰ Existing processes typically involve directionless, free-form training on civil engagement (CE). This is ineffective as some Soldiers may already have the required interpersonal tact to be successful. Conversely, Soldiers who are not competent in human interactions will not become capable simply by rehearsing those ineffective interactions. More importantly, without the understanding of narrative identity theory or skills contained within motivational interviewing, the individual Soldier is unable to effectively engage the target audience. The status quo resembles a violation of direct fire planning by not matching threats and target systems.¹¹ While FM 3-57 offers commonsense encouragement to have, at a minimum, a baseline OE understanding, there is a critical shortfall in this guidance.

The 2018 *National Defense Strategy* states that in order to deter threats “during peace or in war,” “the Joint Force must gain and maintain information superiority; and develop, strengthen, and

sustain U.S. security relationships.”¹² The path to gain and maintain information superiority is possible through instruction on narrative identity. An understanding of narrative identity postures CA forces to understand the ideological foundations of a society through traditional area study research. Narrative identity will provide more clarity to the brevity contained in the definition provided in existing strategic literature that refers to narrative competition as “the rise and fall of a country’s reputation based on general perceptions of its strength, reliability, and resolve.”¹³ In addition, it will prevent the tendency of area studies to become compendiums of endless data and, instead, focus CAO to address what a culture believes and communicates about itself. It will, therefore, allow CA planners to tailor missions to these specific narratives and effectively execute CMI to win without fighting. Narrative identity theory will illuminate where an avenue for influence lies, allowing that avenue to inform CA mission planning.

Narrative identity is present across a variety of behavioral health theories, such as cognitive and behavioral therapy approaches that discuss “core beliefs” and cognitive processing therapy’s “stuck points.” Core beliefs and associated stuck points are underlying belief systems that have become engrained in the individual, resulting in the individual’s insulation and resistance to outside voices. For example, a stuck point of, “I’m at fault for this event,” will not entertain a simplistic external intervention of “don’t blame yourself.” The intervention must match and accurately address the internal self-narrative.

Narrative identity is informed by Piaget’s theory of development. Piaget contended that individuals form schemas, or cognitive frameworks from which all reality is based. A person’s ability to adapt and respond to challenges in the environment is controlled by schemas.¹⁴ Schemas are, therefore, the lens from which we view and relate to the world. Narrative identity is a “model of identity as a life story, complete with setting, scenes, characters, plots, and themes; a big story, an integrative autobiographical project, a personal myth that situates a person in the world, integrates a life in time, and provides meaning and purpose.”¹⁵ Interestingly, identity is malleable as individuals are able to “selectively reconstruct their past in such a way that, step for step, it seems to have planned them, or better, they seem to have planned it.”¹⁶ This creates the sense of self, and placement in the world for the individual; significant information for Soldiers who seek credibility as an information-related capability (IRC).

There are windows of opportunity to win without fighting and employ influence strategies that have been employed in therapeutic settings for generations. In a therapeutic setting, the clinician guides conversations to promote discovery and engender adaptive growth. The recipient may, in fact, be aware the entire time of the intervention and, in ways, remain resistant. Yet, this is the power of effective therapy in clinical settings. For CA, deployments typically take place to locations where that society does not share the viewpoint that near peer competitors are a threat entity or other associated themes that the United States supports. Other realistic scenarios are that the local populace views authoritarianism as a viable option; and yet with the right skill sets, CA forces can still engage and leverage that population in tasks to achieve victory before war.

Narrative identity provides a theoretical basis in behavioral health for those who present as resistant to change and maintain maladaptive behavioral patterns, otherwise known as those entrenched in pathology. These are the most difficult individuals to treat and are frequently written off as “not ready for change.” Schemas and associated impacts of fixed worldviews influence how these individuals view themselves, their surroundings, and their place in the world that can serve as barriers to growth. Conversely, an understanding of the individual’s schema can assist recovery from maladaptive patterns of behavior as it creates the avenue for the clinician to know the right approach for change. External appearances may present an individual as resistant, manipulative, or hostile when providing clinical interventions. Yet, once cognitive schemas are understood, the clinician can provide interventions that address the core belief systems of the patient effectively speaking to the issue at hand. A client may state, “You are only here because you get paid. This is just a job for you.” The competent clinician can counter internal reactivity or the inclination to provide reality orientation by prudently speculating on the client’s core belief system. In this scenario, it is evident that the individual has a skeptical worldview, one that states, “altruism isn’t worthwhile.” Further questioning could uncover a background of neglect and potentially abuse. Subsequently, instead of viewing the client as resistant or hostile, he/she is understood in the proper context.

The CA application becomes intuitive for the ability to engage and leverage the civil component and accomplish the feat of winning without fighting. However, in order to be effective in levels before armed conflict, messaging must impact the existing societal narrative. A simplistic approach that does not reach the depth of a narrative involves adherence to accepted messaging, such as, “U.S. Forces promote freedom and stand against oppression.” However, there are

locations where freedom is not the sole pursuit or focus of the populace. Narratives can change, and identity can be sought under banners of justice as opposed to freedom. In Central and Eastern Europe, much of the draw to extremism and affinities for conspiracy theories are due to perceived lack of fairness.¹⁷ The populace is developing a justice narrative as opposed to freedom.¹⁸ If we are to win without fighting, area study research will pursue and identify streams of information that illuminate the specific societal narrative. When polling is transparently presenting a narrative, it is a prime avenue to shape CAO according to this newly acquired insight. Subsequently, CA missions will then be able to capitalize on a narrative of fairness and avoid ineffective missions that inevitably fall on a non-receptive audience. Just as in the previous clinical example of stating “don’t blame yourself,” CA missions in this example that focus on freedom (the incorrect narrative) will be futile while operations and activities that address justice will result in targeted effects that reflect winning without fighting.

Key points in the fact sheet for the 2022 *National Defense Strategy* articulate an intent of “detering strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners.”¹⁹ In certain OEs, support to allies and partners involves the application of civil network development and engagement (CNDE). CNDE builds relationships and influences public opinion on the presence of military forces that train within alliances and multinational agreements by working with key organizations in the target area. CA is an integral capability when deployed to these settings particularly if the local populace is skeptical of its nation’s participation in an alliance or agreement with the United States to receive a U.S. military presence. Narratives are malleable and are inevitably shaped by cultural events. In Central and Eastern Europe, historical events, including conflict resolution and subsequent territorial consequences, are driving forces in the formation of narrative. Similar to the clinical setting where an individual may be instantly written off as being resistant to treatment, territorial consequences must be front of mind to understand political positions that, from external appearances, appear opportunistic. For example, care must be taken when approaching a population that has experienced negative consequences by historically aligning with a losing side and, therefore, maintains a narrative that full alignment with any alliance is not palatable.

Security studies research can aid the identification of societal narratives to accomplish what Dr. Ajit Maan labels narrative identity assessment. There are numerous data points in examples provided in sources such as GLOBSEC that illuminate the social narrative.²⁰ However, it is

important to distinguish relationships amongst data points. Messages can stand in isolation, but messages are also contained within stories. Ultimately, the accumulated message of stories reflects the societal narrative.²¹ In behavioral health, this understanding would be observed through the depressed individual who refuses to accept praise. The internal narrative would be, “I am not worthy.” The messaging this individual communicates would be self-defeating, such as, “I can’t do anything right.” His/her story would involve fatalistic explanations in the face of adversity or setbacks. This individual would be uncomfortable with praise and would insist success is not attainable for a person who is not worthy. Interventions would have to address the core belief of the narrative to be effective. The simplistic “you can do this” will not reach the individual who maintains this internal messaging, self-story, and self-narrative. So, it is for effective CAO that, for actual influence, the force must know its target audience narrative and tailor the approach.

The importance of civil reconnaissance (CR) is present “because it enables understanding which informs solutions to counter hybrid threats.”²² However, without specific guidance on its methods and the ability to identify narratives, CR can only produce white noise data. In fact, many of the tasks contained within CR and overall analysis are tasks executed by other units.²³ Effective CR involves research to identify and label the narratives that exist within society, even if these are narratives that are not immediately accessible in analysis.²⁴ The ideological frameworks of malign influence reveal the narratives that our adversaries exploit in their application of active measures. In Central Europe, Slavic brotherhood, Christian values, and historical shared experiences over centuries, up to and including the recent history of World War II, indicate a narrative of Russia as big brother as opposed to a threat presence.²⁵

Winning without fighting involves CA forces that appreciate the central importance of narrative in order to effectively execute CAO. Just as the competent therapist must use interventions that reach the client, CAO must direct missions that impact the narrative. The path to victory before war starts with the identification of a narrative and speaking directly to what a society believes of itself, or what an adversary is attempting to exploit. In the therapeutic setting, the clinician notices and pays attention to seemingly unimportant statements and behaviors. For example, the individual who is uncomfortable with praise, or who instantly discounts validation may have the internal narrative of unworthiness. Think tank research may not always use narrative language, but “victory before war” necessitates an ability to notice messages and stories that clearly reflect a narrative.

The GLOBSEC Trends example is most succinct to reflect on as its yearly survey gauges perception on concepts such as a world leader's favorability, a country's membership in NATO, and defense spending. These are important to view as threads within a narrative; but not the narrative itself. There is a suggestion that countering adversary actions and disinformation is accomplished through inoculating target populations from disinformation.²⁶ But if one is well-versed in narrative identity, it would be clear this approach is ineffective. Lt. Col. (Ret.) Brian Steed states that disinformation is effective not based on philosophical value judgments, but rather that it contains "truth." This "truth" speaks to the power of narrative identity. Disinformation and its fabricated or deliberately manipulated information exploits what a society or culture tells itself to be true.

Therefore, if a CA unit only offers isolated messaging without speaking to or addressing the narrative, it will not accomplish intended effects. In addition, attempting to counter disinformation by mentioning its verbiage is counterintuitive as mentioning falsehoods has the unintended effect of strengthening the disinformation intent.²⁷ In the clinical setting, this dynamic works in the following manner. If someone has an identity of "I am stupid", it is imprudent to voice "you are not stupid" as the anchoring effect of the phrase "not stupid" will unintentionally prime the person towards the term "stupid." Instead, a strength orientation to counter that identity is found in "you did well today and accomplished what you intended," has the likelihood to positively impact the individual. For CA, promoting messaging that "the United States is not supporting extremists" may inadvertently support malign influence. Instead, messaging that "the United States promotes justice" will better align with an existing narrative and does not contain problematic verbiage.

Arguments are presented within the competition continuum that narrative competition is the pursuit of reputation and associated strength and reliability.²⁸ This view of narrative lacks the depth contained within narrative identity as it is only the common English understanding of the word *narrative*. It also does not address the stories that a society tells of itself, and conversely how it views outside entities. Inward looking operations, activities, and investments are unproductive. For example, during my rotation in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, there was a historical lack of appreciation for narratives or schemas of the target population. An Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) project was widely shared in United States media. However, follow up analysis by CIMIC/PSYOP of the host nation reflected cynicism and distrust of the

United States. The societal narrative, undoubtedly one that views Russia as a big brother, reflected that the U.S. only provides support if it benefits them. The OHDACA project was, therefore, an ineffective use of resources. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) details at length examples of waste, fraud, and abuse during operations in Afghanistan. It reported that missteps involved logistics and operational considerations, but other issues “were the result of unavoidable assumptions about unknown aspects of Afghan society.”²⁹

Narrative Identity: The Individual and Society

Clarification on the link from person to societal impact is found in describing the cultural master narrative. From this, the individual “tells us about his experiences, but he also tells us about the culture in which he is developing.”³⁰ The cultural master narrative is designed to “articulate the relation between the individuals and their cultural context,” including the level people are able to identify within their cultural context.³¹ Security studies think tank literature illuminate relationships between individual and cultural master narratives that must be understood to effectively execute CAO. Snapshots are given assessing understanding of presence in alliances, defense investments, and perception of threat in the national conscience. The “sophisticated cognitive efforts to find connections” that involve efforts to reconcile conflicts amongst self and culture so that the “self is able to engage fully in personal and cultural relationships, to be a citizen of one’s community” reveal tension in this development.³² The tension this creates can become ambivalence in the therapeutic setting, which is the arena for change. The clinician will notice ambivalence and utilize this as the avenue to work with a client on a different trajectory for his/her life. The specific tools the clinician uses are contained within motivational interviewing.

For CA Soldiers who endeavor to win without fighting, noticing tension within streams of a narrative are the ideal settings for influence. Instead of relying on armed conflict, CA Soldiers can execute missions that utilize messaging within an existing narrative but guide it towards mutually beneficial end states.

Utilizing Narrative Identity and Motivational Interviewing to Engage and Leverage

Once the CA Corps develops awareness of narrative within its CKI process, it can utilize motivational interviewing (MI) as the mechanism for influence. MI is used as “an effective counseling method that enhances motivation through the resolution of ambivalence.”³³ The spirit

of MI, its techniques, and application are ideal measures from which CAO can be effective in the interpersonal actions that make up CNDE and the overarching task of influence. Its application in behavioral health spans a variety of health conditions, including smoking cessation, reducing sexual risk behaviors, improving adherence to treatment and medication, as well as diabetes management.³⁴ Behavioral health interventions are required for individuals with low levels of motivation for change. Motivational Interviewing is the skill set used to work with individuals who are resistant to the need for change or otherwise refuse to recognize the maladaptive patterns of behavior that denial sustains. For a force that wishes to win without fighting., ideally, clients would recognize that self-defeating behaviors should be discontinued and would be, therefore, receptive to common sense guidance to stop it. Similarly, it would be beneficial if adversaries within the competition continuum acquiesced to United States strategic interests; yet the reality of the world is far too complex for such a naïve approach. Winning without fighting involves skillful navigation of the human terrain.

The spirit of MI involves collaboration, evocation, and autonomy. Collaboration is characterized by a “partnership that honors the client’s experiences and perspectives.”³⁵ Evocation is defined as the drawing out of “the resources and motivation for change” that “reside within the client; intrinsic motivation for change is enhanced by drawing on the client’s own perceptions, goals and values.”³⁶ Autonomy occurs when the “counselor affirms the client’s right and capacity for self-direction and facilitates informed choice.”³⁷ MI is not passive but is an active task that guides the recipient in a specific direction. In behavioral health, this would be a positive direction of growth identified by the client. In the military context, this involves objective progress in relation to identified lines of effort. Civil Information Evaluation (CIE) involves analysis of existing data points including the use of Embassy Public Affairs Section polling or think tank research that may provide specific data points for noticeable shifts and improvements in public sentiment. The danger in not having trained CA Soldiers involved is the trap of “bullying or bribery” instead of effective influence.³⁸ Any organization can rely on money to buy influence, but this is shortsighted and creates transient loyalty. Both are costly, and both are destabilizing in nature. Narratives affect dissonance or resonance. Resonance results from affinity for living within and developing amongst the agreed upon narrative. Dissonance occurs when there is tension between the individual and the narrative. The guidance is, therefore, that resonance messaging aligns succinctly with a narrative; dissonance is what takes place when messaging, attitudes, and behaviors of Soldiers are in conflict with the

societal narrative undermining credibility of the mission.³⁹ MI is the strategy “to develop discrepancy, to enhance the perceived importance of change.”⁴⁰

In behavioral health, feelings of ambivalence provide the window of opportunity for MI. Indicators include statements reflecting discomfort, conflict, and apprehension that current behaviors are problematic. The avenue to promote dissonance and enhance change is found in the “MI principal to support autonomy,” specifically identified as the principle of “develop discrepancy.”⁴¹ In the individual setting, this is meant to “distinguish between the patient’s values and behaviors that are inconsistent with their behavior change goals.”⁴² “MI guiding strategies” include “elicit change talk” with the purpose of influencing the individual to articulate “self-reported argument of change.”⁴³ These strategies strive for creating levels of discontent that can facilitate dissonance. A specific how-to is the principle of “roll with resistance.”⁴⁴ Direct argument “may actually press the person in the opposite direction that he or she is caused to defend.”⁴⁵ By rolling with resistance, conflict is eased through communicating respect, promoting a spirit of partnership, and creating the space for the individual to work conflict out organically within a discussion.

Competition is defined as the activities that “states and non-state actors seek to protect and advance their own interests” in addition to the pursuit of “diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage.”⁴⁶ Successful actions in competition occur when “reliable, principled strength attracts allies and partners, who see value in forging a relationship.”⁴⁷ These relationships take place within the auspice of CNDE. Yet, the Training and Evaluation Outline for key leader engagements simplifies this activity in the critical performance step of *establish rapport*. Referring back to narrative, “counter messaging and counter narratives are a bad idea.”⁴⁸ Instead, the focus should be to “swallow up the meaning- provide larger context that reorients the meaning.”⁴⁹ Therefore, engagements must account for narratives and utilize MI to elicit change talk by utilizing questions from the categories of “disadvantages of the status quo, advantages of change, optimism for change, and intention to change.”⁵⁰ When applied in CE, these skills will enable CA forces to be influential by working within existing narratives to identify opportunities for collaboration and means to create dissonance within the aspects of the narrative that are disposed to dissonance variables.

Motivational Interviewing in Practice

Motivational Interviewing would be a critical input to the training process. In the therapeutic setting, clinicians apply the collaborative and influential spirit of MI by waiting for windows of opportunity. This stands in contrast to a careless authoritative approach of demanding change and setting unrealistic expectations. Winning without fighting requires patient Soldiers equipped with the cognitive ability to influence those who are resistant or skeptical to the end states the Soldiers pursue. In the clinical setting, it may escape attention when an agitated individual makes statements like, “I don’t need to be here. I think this whole system is flawed. This is all a waste of time. I just like drinking anyway. My wife yells at me, but she deals with it.” The individual in this scenario, while agitated, has provided a window of access. The relationship with a spouse is undoubtedly relevant, so expanding this source of conflict in the individual’s life will create ambivalence and further space to practice an effective intervention. In addition, the previously discussed skill of *rolling with resistance* is applied by not arguing with the individual about his/her opposition to the treatment environment which inevitably results in a back and forth with no productive end.

In a CE, CA forces must be prepared to identify where to express empathy, when to roll with resistance to avoid argument, and, more importantly, where to seek opportunistic windows where intrapersonal stress can be expanded. By identifying where the individual is uncomfortable and not content with his/her current state, there is a space to achieve victory before war in the pursuit of mutually beneficial end states. These skill sets are priceless and create environments where there is collaboration instead of opposition; the hallmark of winning without fighting.

DOTMLPF-P Impact

The CA force of 2030 can be molded by skills and understanding already present in the social sciences. Adjusting training does not need to be a wholesale shift. As the training process is adjusted for officers and enlisted, with consideration given to the Reserve force, narrative identity theory and motivational interviewing can be added into the training process to promote a force capable of winning without fighting. An individual with graduate level expertise could lead instruction on theoretical constructs to teach how to identify narrative identity in CR and inform

the CKI process. However, there would not need to be extensive education in this regard. Exposure to the theories should be sufficient with the focus being how to identify narratives and focus CA missions with the newly acquired insight. Particularly for CE, this would be a substantive shift from training, as it currently exists, in which individuals must rely on their own ingenuity and creativity when practicing the interpersonal interactions within CE. Motivational interviewing is an art that can be trained by reviewing overarching themes of the theory. CA forces can be enabled to win without fighting once they are experts in cognitive warfare. These experts will be the force of the future that is competent in rolling with the resistance of skeptical or hostile entities in the competition continuum.

Conclusion

Competition requires CA forces that are “culturally attuned and diplomatically astute.”⁵¹ CAO and other doctrine encourage CMI that support the “merits of a locally owned process” and enhance “local capacity development.”⁵² There is the caution that “failure to consider the local cultural context can result in ineffective or irrelevant interventions and may damage relations with local authorities and communities.”⁵³ In the therapeutic arena, this is present in the client’s right to self-determination. The client must own his/her destiny, albeit with the support and guidance of a therapist. Competent CA Soldiers support and facilitate the local populace but must be informed by the cultural context and existing narrative, otherwise missions will be counterproductive at best, or ineffective at worst. Without introducing skills from the social sciences, the CA Corps will remain in an untenable state in which skill sets are marketed but not actually trained or possessed by the force. Essentially, “we are often not what we say we are, and we often cannot do what we tell others we do.”⁵⁴ CA is a unique capability within the Department of Defense that can have great tactical and strategic impact when employed effectively. This is only possible if CA Soldiers are trained appropriately to tailor messaging to existing cultural narratives. The role of engagement and leveraging will be ineffective if the CA force is not able to access critical skill sets within the social sciences to become adept at the nuance of interpersonal exchange that occurs within CE with the required cultural expertise informed by understanding of narrative identity. We can achieve victory before war and win without fighting by mastering the art of influence. CA forces can navigate the nuance of interpersonal engagement by understanding the relationship between society and individual; how the individual perspective is informed by the societal narrative.

Winning without fighting is complicated; but is attainable through mastering MI strategies to engage and influence. By understanding the stories a society holds about itself, and by utilizing MI strategies, CA forces can achieve victory before war. The CA Corps will dedicate these newfound skills and participate as one entity within national strengths to “advance our vision of a free, open, prosperous, and secure world, outmaneuvering our competitors, and making meaningful progress” to the causes any vibrant democracy holds dear.⁵⁵

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Endnotes

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